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Seitas et al.: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.
I. SUMMARY CONTEMPT: IMMEDIATE, COMPELLING
NEED REQUffiED

A.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Gustafsonl the Ninth Citcuit held that there must
be a compelling reason for immediate action before a court can
use its summary contempt power.2 During final argument, the
defense counsel urged the jury to consider the effect of a conviction on the defendant's family. The prosecution objected and
the court instructed the jury that sympathy was an impermissible basis for the verdict. Despite further warnings from the
court, counsel continued his sympathy appeal, telling the jury
that the bench and prosecution were "quashing and quelling this
evidence of a defense counsel trying to do his level best for his
client."S The court then recessed for the day, excused the jury,
and summarily held the attorney in contempt.

The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that summary contempt was inappropriate because there was no showing that the
attorney's conduct caused a material obstruction to an ongoing
trial.
B.

BACKGROUND

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a),' a judge
1. 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ferguson, J., the other panel members were
Ely, J., and Wright, J., dissenting).
2. The crinlinal contempt power of the federal courts is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 401
(1976) which provides in pertinent part: "A court of the United States shall have the
power to punish by fine or inlprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other as-(l) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice." Disposition of crinlinal contempts is contained in FED. R. CRIM. P. 42. Rule 42(a) provides for summary disposition, see not.e 4
infra, while rule 42(b) provides for disposition upon notice and hearing, see note 5 infra.
3. 619 F.2d at 1356.
4. FEn. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) provides:
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can summarily punish contemptuous conduct if committed in
the court's presence and if the judge certifies that she or he witnessed the conduct. Otherwise, there must be disposition with
notice and a hearing ullder rule 42(b)}' Traditionally, the lack of
notice and a, hearing has been justified by (1) the need to maintain order in the courtroom;6 (2) the availability of appellate review to safeguard the ,contemnor's rights;? and (3) the wastefulness of a second trial because the court itself witnessed the
conduct. s
Increasing sensitivity to due process rights has put further
limitations on the summary contempt power. The Supreme
Court has limited incarceration to a maximum of six months,9
has held that summWJ disposition is unavailable if there is judicial bias,lO and has recognized the conflict between an attorney's
roles as an advocate for his or her client and as an officer of the
court.11 The Supreme Court has required an actual obstruction
of justice before SUlll1l!lary contempt is appropriate. 12
In Harris v. United States,18 the Supreme Court limited the
summary contempt power to circumstances in which time is of
the essence. This limitation has been put into doubt by the
Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in
the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall
recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of
record.
5. Rule 42(b) requires that notice be given by the judge in open court or on an
application of the U.S. attorney or of an attorney appointed for that purpose, on an
order to show cause or an arrest order. The alleged contemnor is entitled to a reasonable
amount of time to prepare his or her case and to a jury trial. If the contempt involved
judicial disrespect, then that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing.
6. Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888).
7. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
8. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925).
9. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
10. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 9 (1971) (no summary contempt if the judge has
demonstrated an attitude and position clearly adverse to the alleged contemnor); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (no summary contempt if judge so grossly
insulted that prejudice may be presumed); Oftbut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)
(no summary contempt if judge becomes personally embroiled with the alleged
contemnor).
11. In re McConnel, 370 U.S. 30 (1962).
12.Id.
13. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
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Court's decision, nine years later, in United States v. Wilson.14
Many commentatorslG believe Wilson limited Harris to its fac·
tual setting and re·established discretionary power in the trial
court. Some courts, however,1s including the Ninth Circuit in
Gustafson, believe that Wilson reaffirmed the time of the es·
sence requirement.
C.

THE

NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION

The Majority Holding
The majority found no compelling reasons for summary
contempt in Gustafson because there was no material obstruc·
tion or frustration of the proceedings, and therefore, no need for
immediate action. The court noted17 that there was no disrup·
tion of the trial,18 that summary contempt was not necessary as
an incentive/s that the trial day ended normally,20 and.that the
trial would not have been imperiled by a rule 42(b) hearing. 21
The majority relied upon United States v. Wilson,22 in which
the Supreme Court held that summary contempt was appropri·
ate when a witness refused to testify at trial even after a grant of
immunity because (1) the witness' refusal to testify frustrated an
ongoing proceeding; (2) the threat of summary contempt provided an incentive for the witness to testify; and (3) a full hearing would have caused such a harmful delay as to imperil the
trial.
14. 421 U.S. 309 (1974).
15. Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88
YALE L.J. 39 (1978); Note, United States v. Wilson: An Expansive Approach to the
Power of the Federal Courts to Punish Contempts under rule 42(a) of the Federal
Courts of Criminal Procedure, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 747 (1977); Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Rules for the Prosecutor and Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REv.
483 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975) (summary contempt may properly be applied to the orderly refusal of witnesses to testify at trial after grant of
immunity).
16. United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1979); Krueger v. State, 351
So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
17. 619 F.2d at 1358.
18. A reference to the Wilson Court's examination of the disruptiveness of the contemnor's conduct. See 421 U.S. at 316.
19. A reference to the Wilson Court's finding that summary criminal contempt may
be used as an incentive. See id.
20. Sacher v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925).
21. A reference to the Harris Court's consideration of whether the proceeding would
be imperiled by a rule 42(b) hearing. See 382 U.S. at 164.
22. 421 U.S. 309 (1974).
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The Supreme Court distinguished Wilson from Harris,23
where summary contempt was held inappropriate for an orderly
refusal to testify before a grand jury. While a grand jury has
many inquires before it, and can easily suspend action on any
one case while a 42(b) contempt hearing is held, a trial court
"cannot be expected to dart from case to case."2" The Supreme
CQurt reasoned that a delay at trial not only adversely affects all
individuals assembled for the trial, but has a rippling delay effect on all scheduled trials. The Wilson court concluded that
"[w]here time is not of the essence, however, the provisions of
Rule 42(b) may be more appropriate to deal with contemptuous
conduct."25
The majority did lrlot rule on whether the defense counsel's
conduct was contemptuous because it reversed on the ground
that summary disposition was inappropriate. They did, however,
list factors to consider in determining whether an attorney's
comments amount to Ii material obstruction sufficient to justify
summary contempt. ,]~hese factors are (1) the reasonably expected reactions of those in the courtroom, (2) the manner in
which the remarks ar«~ delivered, (3) the delay to the proceedings caused by the disrespectful outburst, and (4) the failure to
heed explicit directives of the COurt.26
The Dissent

Judge Wright, argued that summary contempt was appropriate because defense counsel's comments were per se contemptuous27 and rule 42(a) requires only that the contempt be in the
court's presence and certified by the judge. Judge Wright believed the majority rewrote rule 42(a) by adding requirements of
a material obstruction and an immediate need for action. Summary contempt power, he argued, is necessary for immediate
vindication of the court's dignity and authority, and the trial
judge should be allowed discretion.28 Judge Wright construed
23. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
24. 421 U.S. at 318.
25. [d. at 319.
26. 619 F.2d at 1359.
27. Judge Wright stated that an attorney's comments which are disrespectful to the
court are per se contemptuous. Specifically, he focused on the attorney's charge of collusion between the bench and the prosecutor. 619 F.2d at 1362-63.
28. 619 F.2d at 1365 (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925».
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Wilson as a literal reading of rule 42(a).and as leaviIig discretion
with the trial court. The dissent stressed29 that the Wilson
Court said "[w]here time is not of the essence. . . the provisions
of rule 42(b) may be more appropriate," and that time be of the
essence is not a requirement, but a discretionary factor left with
the trial judge.
The dissent also stated that the majority departed from its
own precedents by ignoring MacInnis v. United States,30 where
counsel's disrespectful comments were held per se contemptuous
and therefore summarily punishable; and wrongly relied upon
Gordon v. United States31 where counsel was held liable to summary contempt for his disrespectful comments.
D.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The crucial difference between the majority and dissenting
opinions lies in their interpretations of United States v. Wilson.
The majority's reading that there must be a breakdown of the
trial and a compelling reason for immediate action by the court
before the summary contempt power can be exercised is the better position for it recognizes that summary contempt is a drastic
remedy whose application should be limited.
The dissent's position that disrespectful comments are per
se contemptuous and therefore subject to immediate vindication
of authority by the court, ignores Supreme Court decisions.
MacInnis v. United States,32 cited by the dissent, was decided
in 1951, before the Supreme Court made a series of rulings regarding summary contempt and disrespect to the COurt. 33 While
these cases focused on the problem of biased judges exercising
the summary contempt power, they indicated that disrespectful
comments are not per se subject to summary contempt, and
may, because of the hostility the comments may engender in the
trial court judge, require that the judge step down and a rule
29. 619 F.2d at 1365-66.
30. 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952). The circuit court
stated, "The act of addressing the court in open session with the statements 'you should
cite yourself for misconduct' and 'you ought to be ashamed of yourself', unmodified, are,
per se, contemptuous." 191 F.2d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1951).
31. 592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979).
32. 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952).
33. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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42(b) hearing be held.
The dissent also ignored the Supreme Court decision in In
re McConnel,s" where the Court held there must be an actual
obstruction of justice before summary power is available for disrespectful comments made by an attorney. The more recent
Ninth Circuit decisions regarding the appropriateness of summary contempt for disrespect shown by counsel toward the court
require a showing of both contemptuous conduct and material
obstruction.S5
Neither is time of the essence a new requirement by the
Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Abascals6 the Ninth Circuit
ruled on a similar fact pattern and examined whether time was
of the essence. During the noon recess, the alleged contemnor in
Abascal failed to step forward as ordered by the court. While
the court of appeals found that the conduct was contemptuous,
the court ruled summary contempt was inappropriate because
there was no threat to an ongoing proceeding, nor would any
proceeding be imperiled by a full contempt hearing under rule
42(b).
What the dissent failed to appreciate in this case was that,
at the time of the contempt citation, the court was in recess.
Counsel was not interrupting any proceeding at the time cited
and the court could easily have, and should have, held a rule
42(b) proceeding.

The Effect of the Deci.sion
It is possible that future Ninth Circuit decisions might uphold a summary contempt citation for the same behavior as displayed by Gustafson if the judge cited the attorney during trial.
34. 370 u.S. 230 (1962).
35. Hawk v. Cardoza, 575 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The need for judicial order
is not fixed but must be considered in the context of each case. The length of a trial,
surrounding controversy, prior warnings from the trial judge and prior conduct of the
contemnor are among factors which must be considered in assessing the validity of summary contempt citations:"); United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975); Weiss
v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 984 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Due process requires that contemnors, such
as Weiss, who are not cited and simultaneously punished for the purpose of restoring
courtroom decorum or protecting the safety of court officials are entitled to an opportunity for allocution". (Footnotes omitted».
36. 509 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975).
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In a case cited with approval by the majority, Gordon v. United
States,81 a pro se publico defendant88 was held in summary contempt for a speech attacking the court. The majority cited
Gordon as requiring a material obstruction of justice before the
utterer of disrespectful comments can be held contemptuous
and liable to summary punishment. The majority distinguished
Gustafson from Gordon, where summary contempt was upheld,
because "the conduct at issue had caused 'not insubstantial' and
'entirely unnecessary' delays which substantially disrupted the
trial. "39 While the Gordon court spoke of the hearing becoming
as much of a contempt proceeding as a probation revocation,40
thus indicating a substantial disruption, it is. possible to imagine
later courts focusing on the trial judge's comment that he could
either hold Gordon in contempt or consider him a "harmless nut
and forget it"41 and conclude that there doesn't really have to be
a compelling reason for immediate action.

Further evidence of the possibility that Gustafson may be
limited to out-of-trial settings is the majority's reliance on
United States v. Brannon. 42 Brannon held there must be a compelling reason for immediate action before summary contempt is
permissible. In Brannon, a witness refused to testify at trial.
The witness was not summarily held in contempt at that time
but only after the trial was finished. The Fifth Circuit ruled the
delay was fatal to the summary contempt citation, noting that a
compelling reason for its use existed at the time of the witness'
refusal, but not at the end of trial. Thus, future Ninth Circuit
decisions could focus on the same distinction made in Brannon,
concluding Gustafson, like Brannon, is meant to apply only to
contemptuous acts outside of the actual trial.
On the other hand., the majority did focus on Gustafson's
behavior at trial, and not on whether the summary contempt ci37. 592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979).
38. The court's opinion did not focus on the fact that Gustafson was an attorney,
but rather upon the conduct he displayed. Therefore, the fact that Gordon was a pro se
publico defendant does not seem an important distinction. It is important to note that
because the Gustafson court did not appear to limit its holding to attorneys, it should
apply to any contemnor.
39. 619 F.2d at 1360.
40. 592 F.2d at 1218.
41. ld. at 1218 n.2.
42. 546 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977).
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tation actually was made during the trial or not. Additionally,
the majority repeatedly stressed that summary contempt was a
harsh remedy, that due process guarantees dictate that summary
contempt be used sparingly, and that the power to punish for
contempt should always be limited to "the best possible power
adequate to the end proposed."43

E.

CONCLUSION

The summary contempt power has been much critized as a
denial of due process.44 Several commentators have suggested
that the threat of a criminal contempt conviction upon a later
hearing is sufficient to allow the court to maintain its authority
while safeguarding the contemnor's rights. The Ninth Circuit is
taking a step in the right direction by recognizing that summary
contempt "is a drastic remedy and should be used only when
there is a compelling reason for immediate action.

Patricia A. Seitas*

II. THE NINTH CmCUIT PROHffiITS RANDOM NIGHTTIME STOPS OF BOATS
A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Piner,l the Ninth Circuit held that ran-

dom nighttime safety checks of boats violate the fourth amend43. 619 F.2d at 1361.
44. Note, Counsel and Contempt: A Suggestion that the Summary Power Be Eliminated, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 289 (1980); Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique
and a New Perspective, 88 YJ.LE L.J. 39 (1978); Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power
and the Constitution: the View from Within and Without, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1976),
Note, Direct Criminal Contempt: An Analysis of Due Process and Jury Trial Rights, 11
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 77 (1975); Note, Taylor v. Hayes-a Case Study in the Use of
" Summary Contempt Against an Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945 (1975); N. DOMEN & L.
FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT (1973); Note, Attorneys and the Summary Contempt
Sanction, 25 ME. L. REV. 89 (1973); Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Sug-

gestion that Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 463 (1966).

* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. Sept., 1979) (per Merrill, J.; the other panel members were
King, D. J., sitting by designation, and Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ment. 2 While on night patrol in the San Francisco Bay, United
States Coast Guard officers saw defendants' forty-three-foot
pleasure boat between Tiburon and Angel Island. Coast Guard
officers boarded the sailboat to conduct "a routine safety inspection."s The officers had neither probable cause nor a reasonable
suspicion that defendants were violating any law or regulation.
Stepping on board, one of the officers observed what he thought
were bags of marijuana in a cabin below deck. The officers immediately arrested the defendants. The Coast Guard seized and
searched the boat, uncovering over two tons of marijuana. The
defendants were indicted for importation of, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to import and distribute
marijuana. "
At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence of
the marijuana on the ground that the stop constituted an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. The district court
granted the motion. IS The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying
predominantly on the recent Supreme Court decision in Delaware v. Prouse, 6 which held unconstitutional random stops of
automobiles. The Ninth Circuit extended the Prouse decision to
apply to random nighttime stops of boats. The Piner court held
that without at least a "reasonable and articulable"'l suspicion of
noncompliance with safety regulations, the fourth amendment
proscribes the random stop and boarding of a boat after dark for
a safety and registration inspection.8
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 608 F.2d at 359.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) proscribes the importation of marijuana; 21 U.S.C. §
963 (1976) proscribes the conspiracy to import marijuana; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976)
proscribes the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; and 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1976) proscribes the conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.
S. United States v. Piner, 452 F.Supp. 1335 (N.D.Cal. 1978).
6. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
7. 608 F.2d at 361.
8. [d.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONS

On their face, federal statutes9 appear to give the Coast
Guard plenary power to, at any time, stop and search any vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Ninth Circuit has severely limited the scope of these statutes,I° although
other circuits have wholeheartedly accepted them. l l This discord
among the circuits revolves around the constitutionality of two
fourth amendment excl~ptions: stops and searches at the border,
and stops by administrative agencies. 12
9. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over
which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention,
detention, and suppression of violations of laws of the United
States. For such purposes • . . officers may at any time go on
board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction . . • of the
United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine
the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and
search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance . . • • (Emphasis added).
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976) provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any
vessel •.• at any place in the United States or within the
customs waters or. . • within a customs-enforcement area. . .
or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his
district . • • and examine, inspect, and search the vessel . . •
and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or
cargo on board • • • • (Emphasis added).
19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1976) defines "customs waters" as extending four leagues (about 12
nautical miles) from the coast.
10. United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952
(1977) (Coast Guard is subject to the limitations imposed by the fourth amendment);
United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976) (a stop under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)
(1976) requires probable cause or a search warrant unless a border stop); United States
v. Jones, 528 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1975) (dictum) (land search
allowed under § 1581(a) of a boat being transported via a trailer would violate the fourth
amendment).
11. United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.) (the fourth amendment does
not prohibit document inspections in the absence of any suspicion in customs waters),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978)
(upheld a stop under § 1581(a»; United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.) (upheld a stop and search under § 89(a», rev'd on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (1980).
United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.) (upholding border search under § 1581(a»,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
12. A third exception, exigent circumstances, is also used to bypass the Fourth
Amendment requirements. The scope of this Note, however, is limited to random stops
where exigent circumstances do no exist. See Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling,
The Fourth Amendment, am! Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REV. 725 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as High on the Seas].
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The Border Stop and Search Exception
A warrantless stop and search at a border or its functional
equivalents need not be based on consent or probable cause of
an existing violation. The border search exception is based on an
interest in "national self preservation [which] reasonably require[s] one entering the country to identify himself to come in,
and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought
in. "l3 Although the Supreme Court has never considered cases
challenging the constitutionality of a border stop and search of a
vessel,14 in recent decisions, the Court limited the scope of border searches of automobiles. lIS
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,16 a roving border patrol stopped defendant about twenty-five air miles from the
Mexican border to search for illegal aliens. The government justified the warrantless search on section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,l'1 which grants the border patrol
power to search without a warrant any vehicle within a "reasonable distance "l8 from the border. The search unveiled marijuana
instead of illegal aliens. The Court held that the search violated
the fourth amendment because it was based on neither consent
nor probable cause to believe a violation had occurred. 19 The
Court also found that routine border searches are only permissi13. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1924) (dictum).
14. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following cases involving border
stops and searches of vessels: United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1838 (1980); United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 422 (1979); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978); United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1977); United States v. Jones, 528 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 960 (1975); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1121 (1968).
15. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975), see text accompanying
note 23 infra; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), see text accompanying notes
21 & 22 infra; United States v. Brignono·Pounce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (upheld a roving
border patrol stop based on "specific articulable facts"); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), see text accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
16. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976) provides that "if [a]ny officer or employee of the
Service authorized under regulations proscribed by the Attorney General shall have
power without warrant. . . within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of
the United States, to board and search for aliens •..• "
18. A "reasonable distance" is usually defined as 100 air miles from any external
boundary of the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1980).
19. 413 U.S. at 274-75.
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ble at the border or at the "functional equivalent."2o The Court
gave two examples of aL "functional equivalent" of a border: a
station near the border where two roads from the border join,
and an airport terminal where flights from other countries are
received.
In United States IJ. Ortiz,21 the Supreme Court extended
Almeida-Sanchez to hold unconstitutional random, warrantless
searches conducted at established border stops. In Ortiz, the defendant was stopped at a border checkpoint sixty-two miles
north of the Mexican border. Although the Border Patrol officer
had no reason to believe defendant was transporting illegal
aliens, he instructed defendant to open the trunk of his car. In
the trunk were three illegal aliens. The Supreme Court held that
without either consent or probable cause, a warrantless search
by border patrol officers at traffic checkpoints removed from the
bord~r or its functional equivalent violated the fourth amendment. 22 In a subsequent case, however, the Supreme Court upheld brief questioning at permanent traffic checkpoints even
though the Almeida-Sanchez requirements were not met.2S

The Administrative Stop and Search Exception
A warrantless stop and search by an administrative agency,
based on neither consent nor probable cause, can only be conducted of industries under strict federal control. The administrative search was created to deter violations of regulations by
subjecting certain indlllStries to random inspection. In Camara v.
Municipal Court~4 the Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the fourth amEmdment and administrative searches. In
Camara, a city housing inspector was making a routine annual
inspection of an apartment building25 when defendant refused to
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

[d. at 272-73.
422 U.S. 891 (1975).
[d. at 896-97.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975).
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Section 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code provides:
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their
duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the
right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or
premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them
by the Municipal Code.
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allow the inspector access to his apartment without a search
warrant. The Supreme Court held that under the fourth amendment the defendant had a constitutional right to insist that the
inspector obtain a search warrant before allowing him entry into
his residence. 2s In See v. City of Seattle,27 the Court extended
the Camara rule to apply to businesses, holding that the defendant in See had a constitutional right to insist that a fire inspector obtain a warrant prior to entry.2S
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,29 the Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of warrantless administrative searches. Defendant, a retail liquor dealer,
refused federal agents entry into a locked storeroom. Without a
search warrant or probable cause, the agents broke the lock,
found illegal liquor inside and seized it as evidence. The Supreme Court found the See rule inapplicable in Colonnade because a person in the liquor industry knew at the time he received his license that the industry was under strick federal
regulation and that Congress had established sanctions for obstructing warrantless searches.30 In United States v. Biswell,31
the Supreme Court extended the Colonnade rationale to the
firearms industry. More recently, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,32
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Biswell-Colonnade exception
to the See rule. 33
11 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HOUSING CODE § 503 (1964), reprinted in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
26. 387 U.S. at 539.
27. 387 U.S. at 541.
28. The Seattle Fire Code § 8.01.050, reprinted in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967), allows warrantless inspections of all buildings, except the interior of premises, to correct any conditions which may cause fires.
29. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
30. [d. at 77.
31. 406 U.S. 311 (1972), construed in Almeida·Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at
266 (1973).
32. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
33. In Marshall, the Supreme Court held warrantless searches under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) unconstitutional unless fourth amendment
requirements were met. Section 8(a) of OSHA allows the Secretary to enter and inspect
any work area and to inspect all machinery to look for violations of regulations. Speaking
to the Secretary's efforts to apply inspections under OSHA to the Biswell-Colonnade
exception, the Court said that "[c]ertain industries have .•. a history of government
oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the
stock of such enterprise." 436 U.S. at 313 (citation omitted). Both the liquor (Colonnade)
and firearm (Biswell) industries are within this delineation because a person engaging in
either "has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regula-
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Although the Supreme Court has not decided the constitutionality of administrative stops of vessels, in its recent decision
of Delaware v. Prouse,1H the Court held an administrative automobile stop unconstitutional. In Prouse, a highway patrolman
stopped defendant to check his driver's license and automobile
registration. The patrolman had no probable cause to stop because he did not observe, and had no suspicion of, any traffic
violation. The patrolman, however, smelled, and subsequently
saw, marijuana in plailll view.311
The trial court held that the random stop, being wholly capricious, violated the fourth amendment and granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana. The
Supreme Court affirmed.3S Noting that the purpose of the fourth
amendment is to maintain a standard of "reasonableness"37
upon the discretionary power of government officials, the Court
adopted a two-part balancing test:38 first, the intrusion of a particular law-enforcemellt practice on an individual's fourth
amendment interests L'3 balanced against its promotion of a legitimate governmental interest, second, the facts on which the
intrusion is based must be measured against an objective standard. 39 The Prouse Court went on to endorse checkpoint stops
as an alternative to ra:ndom ones.40
C.

THE COURT'S .ANAJ~YSIS

The Majority

Relying predominantly on Prouse, the Piner court upheld
tions." I d.
34. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
35. For an admissible plain view seizure, the officer must have a right to be where he
is when he sees the item, the item must be in plain view, the item must have a nexus to
criminality and the discovery must be inadvertant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971).
•
36. 440 U.S. at 663.
37. Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
38. 440 U.S. at 654.
39. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30 (1968), the objective standard was whether an
officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
The Prouse Court also adopted as an alternative to the probable cause requirement the
determination by a neutral and detached magistrate that the standard has been met. 440
U.S. at 654 (citing Mincey v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385 (1978».
40. 440 U.S. at 656-57 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975». See text accompanying notes 15 & 21-23
supra.
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the motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence.41 The Piner
court extended the Prouse rationale to hold random nighttime
stops of boats unconstitutional. Adopting the Prouse balancing
test, the Piner court determined that the governmental need for
random boat stops does not outweigh the concern, annoyance,
and fright an individual experiences when subject to such stops
at night. 42 Reasoning that the purpose of random stops is to discourage noncompliance with safety regulations, the Piner court
found random daytime stops sufficient to deter safety regulation
violations while creating less annoyance and fright in the average boat owner. The court further held that nighttime stops
should be allowed only where there is cause to suspect noncompliance with safety regulations.
The Piner court acknowledged the statutory authority for
random boat stops,4s but distinguished commercial boats from
pleasure crafts!4 The Piner court also recognized statutory authority for customs inspections parallel to that for random boat
stops,41S and cited Fifth Circuit cases which relied on these statutes to hold random boat stops constitutional!6 Yet, the Piner
court chose not to follow either the statutory authority allowing
random boat stops or the Fifth Circuit cases supporting them.
Instead, the Piner court relied on Prouse 4? in finding random
nighttime stops unconstitutional.4s
The Dissent

Judge Kennedy dissented on several grounds. First, he distinguished Prouse from Piner on the ground that the Prouse decision was limited to random stops of automobiles. The dissent
noted that the Prouse decision was based on the limited produc41. 608 F.2d at 361.
42. Id.
43. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976). The statutory language is set forth in supra note 9.
44. Under 33 C.F.R. §§ 175.1 & 177.01 (1980), safety equipment are required on
pleasure boats only when the boat is in use. Commercial boats are required to comply
with safety regulations at all times, even when the boat is not in use.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). The statutory language is set forth in supra note 9.
46. United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
47. 608 F.2d at 360-61.
48. The district court found Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
controlling in holding random boat stops unconstitutional. See text accompanying notes
24-33 supra.
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tivity of random automobile stopS,-49 a limitation not present in
random stops of boats. 60
The dissent argued that the less intrusive alternatives the
Prouse Court suggested for insuring that automobile drivers
complied with safety regulations51 were unavailable to random
boat stopS.52 The dissent also criticized the majority's alternative
of limiting random stops to the daytime as going against the basic purpose of random stops. The dissent argued that random
stops were created to promote safety, and to allow nighttime violators to go undetected would be more dangerous than to allow
daytime violators to go unchecked.
The dissent also argued that random stops by the Coast
Guard are allowed by statute.58 The dissent traced the powers
vested in the Coast Guard back to their origin. 54 Section thirtyone of the Revenue Cutter Act of 1790, the dissent observed,
placed no limitations on boat inspectors and, more importantly,
49. Although no statistics were given, the Prouse Court noted that "the number of
licensed drivers who will be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be large
indeed." ~O U.S. at 660.
50. In his dissent, Judge Kennedy observed that approximately 40% of the boats
stopped in 1977 were not in compliance with safety regulations. 608 F.2d at 362.
51. The dissent suggested three alternatives: 1) stopping observed violators. Once
stopped, license and registration papers could be checked to see what, if any, other regulations have been violated; 2) requiring an annual safety inspection would prevent violators from eluding the law. Upon passing this inspection, a sticker is issued and must be
displayed; 3) establishing road block stops. 608 F.2d at 362.
52. The first alternative, stopping visible violators, is unavailable because many, if
not all, boat safety violations can only be discovered by boarding and taking inventory of
required items. Such items are normally kept below deck unless needed. The second
alternative, annual inspection!!, is unavailable to boats because safety equipment is normally kept at home until the boat is used. The third alternative, road block stops, is
impractical unless particular throughfares are established on which road blocks can be
put. 608 F.2d at 362.
53. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). The language of both statutes are set forth in note 9 silpra.
" 54. The dissent argued that the Coast Guard's authority to board vessels originated
in § 31 of the Revenue Cutter Service Act of 1790 which provided:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors, and the officers of the revenue cutters . . • to
go on board of snips or vessels in any part of the United
States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to
the United States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purpose of demanding the manifests aforesaid,
and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels; and
the said officera respectively shall have free access to the
cabin, and every other part of the ship or vessel . . . .
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was created by the same Congress that proposed the fourth
amendment. In addition, this statute left the right to randomly
stop and search a vessel unqualified while limiting such a stop
and search of a "vehicle, beast or person" to those based on a
"reasonable cause to suspect" a violation. 1I11 The dissent found
further support for distinguishing stops of boats from stops of
automobiles in Maul v. United States. 1I6 Justices Brandeis and
Holmes, concurring in that case, argued that there was "no limitation" on a warrantless seizure of a vessel while the seizure of
"persons, papers and effects" was limited by the Constitution.1I7
The dissent argued that Piner should come within the Biswell-Colonnade exception for activities under strict federal regulation. The dissent maintained that the governmental interest in
insuring safety coupled with 200 years of federal regulation more
than qualified random boat stops under this limited exception.
Finally, the dissent argued that the defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy because the marijuana was in plain
view. The dissent argued that the Coast Guard officers only
stepped onto the exposed deck of the defendants' boat and violated no legitimate expectation of privacy. Once there, the marijuana was subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine. This
argument assumes that the Coast Guard had a right to be on the
exposed deck of the boat.
D.

THE

Piner

DECISION CRITICIZED

Factually, Piner and Prouse are similar in many ways. Both
cases involved a stop based on neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion of a safety violation,158 both stops occurred in
the early evening,1I9 and both involved seized marijuana in plain
view. 60 The major factual difference between the two cases is
that Piner involved a boat and Prouse an automobile. The
courts, however, came to different results. Although the Prouse
Court held random automobile stops unreasonable under the
fourth amendment, the Piner court only found random night55.ld. § 3.
5S. 274 U.S. 501 (1927).
57. ld. at 524.
58. 440 U.S. at S50; S08 F.2d at 359.
59.ld.
SO.ld.
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time boat stops unreasonable. Following the holding in Prouse,
the Piner court should have ruled all random boat stops unconstitutional. Had the Piner court so held, the Ninth Circuit could
have suggested, as a less intrusive alternative, a system of annual safety inspections for boats similar to that presently used
in most states for annual safety inspections of automobiles.61
Less burdensome alternatives to random boat stops were
suggested in a recent la.w review article.62 One alternative was to
establish inspection staLtions, either temporary or permanent, at
centrally located ports along the coast.6S Following a successful
inspection, decals would be issued for display near the boat's
name. The color of the decals cowd be changed each year to insure each boat was inspected annually. Boats without valid decals could be stopped and inspected, because inspectors would
have probable cause to. believe that these boats either failed the
first inspection or had never been inspected.
The burdens imposed by the annual safety check alternative
on the average boat owner would be minimal compared to those
of a random stop system since the owner would have the choice
of when, within certain time limitations, the inspection would be
conducted. Such a system may take several years to implement,
but once established, the intrusiveness on the individual boat
owner would be no more than that which the average automobile
owner faces today. AmlUal safety checks would also be more efficacious than random stops because all boats would be subject to
annual inspections, not just those chosen at random.
E.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF

Piner

As a practical matter, nighttime boat stops and searches are
still permissible. Since Almeida-Sanchez, in which the Supreme
Court upheld ~earches at' borders and their functional
equivalents, the Ninth Circuit has held that a bay is the "func61. Thirty states require periodic safety inspections. For example, New York law
provides that all vehicles must be inspected annually and must bear a certificate of a
successful inspection. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 301 - 305 (McKinney 1970).
62. See High on the Seas, supra note 12, at 744-50.
63. Other suggested alternatives include dockside safety checks to motivate the
purchase of safety equipment and random lottery of certain characteristics of the boat,
such as last three numbers of the boat identification number or certain types of boats.
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tional equivalents" of a border.a. This interpretation, however,
applies only to vessels which have crossed an international border.61$ In cases similar to Piner, a stop and search of a boat in a
bay could be conducted as a border search if the Coast Guard
learns that the boat to be searched had recently crossed an international border.6s Such knowledge could be obtained either
directly through inquiry to the boat owner or indirectly via a
radio call to a central Coast Guard station. In Piner, neither was
attempted. Such inquiries should be made in the future. If it
were learned that the boat had recently sailed in foreign waters,
a warrantless search could be conducted, at day or at night, as a
border search even if neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion of a violation existed"~'1

Robinson R. Ng*

Ill. NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS BERRY STANDARD FOR
NEW TRIALS BASED UPON PERJURED TESTIMONY
In United States v. Krasny,! a case of first impression, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the traditional standard2 for new trial motions based upon perjured testimony by a
material government witness. Rejecting a more liberal standard
applied by a majority of the circuits in cases involving perjured
or recanted testimony, the court chose not to distinguish between perjured testimony and other types of newly discovered
evidence.
64. United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975).
65. [d. at 1372.
66. In United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit held

that border searches apply to boats leaving the United States as well as those coming in.
67. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text.
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Chambers, J., and Ely, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980).
2. The traditional standard was first set forth in Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 527
(1851). See note 23 infra and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit never explicitly
referred to Berry, but did rely on United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 902 (1976), which cited Berry.
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FACTS OF THE CAS]~

Defendant, Krasny, was convicted on charges of conspiracy
to import heroin into the United States and to possess heroin
with intent to distribute.8 He subsequently filed a motion for
new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33
(rule 33):' The defendant based his motion upon the discovery
of evidence subsequent to the trial allegedly showing perjury by .
a material government witness. The witness, one of Krasny's accomplices, according to information proffered by the government, lied at trial regarding the extent of her prior criminal activity. During the trial, the witness offered testimony stressing
Krasny's role as principal in the conspiracy, playing down her
own part. Krasny's defense of duress at trial was rebutted
largely by this witness' testimony and her cooperation with government agents in producing tapes of incriminating conversations with Krasny. Krasny argued that his duress defense was
more credible in light of the new evidence.Ii
The district court denied the motion for new trial on the
sole ground that the new evidence was cumulative and would
not have changed the jury's verdict.6
3. 607 F.2d at 841. Defendant's conviction was based on violations of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 846, 952, 963 (1970).
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. '!'he rule was promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court as Rule IT of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U.S. 661 (1934), and
amended by Congress in accOl:dance with its statutory authority in 1966. In relevant part
the rule provides:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to
him if required in the interest of justice. • . • A motion for a
new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence
may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial
based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after
verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the
court may fix during the 7-day period.
Some commentators have suggested that there should be no time limit for motions
based on newly discovered evidence. See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 557 (1969). The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, approved by the
American Bar Association, have discontinued the 2-year limit for motions for new trial
based upon newly discovered evidence. Instead, rule 552 of the Uniform Rules provides
that the motion must be made with reasonable diligence. See D. EpSTEIN & D. AUSTERN,
UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS, ABA Criminal Justice Section 156 (1975).
5. 607 F.2d at 842.
6. Id. The district judge's one sentence opinion stated as follows: "I find that the
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The court of appeals found the lower court record insufficient to determine whether the district judge had abused his discretion in applying the standard for the motion for new trial. As
a result, the appellate court vacated and remanded the judgment
to the district court for a factual determination of the basis for
the denial. 7 The Ninth Circuit held that district courts must apply the following standard to determine whether perjured testimony requires a new trial: (1) the evidence must be discovered
after the trial; (2) the discovery after trial must not have been
caused by a lack of diligence by the defendant's attorney; (3) the
evidence must be material to the issues and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and, (4) the evidence at a new trial would
probably result in acquittal.
B.

BACKGROUND

Rule 33 confers upon district courts the power to grant a
new trial if it is "in the interest of justice" to do SO. 8 Most new
trial motions are predicated upon violations of constitutional
guarantees.9 However, motions for new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence are not. Motions based on this ground are
considered checks on the fallibility of the criminal justice system, insuring "the integrity of the factfinding process and a fair
trial for the accused . . . ."10
District judges may exercise broad discretion in ruling upon
motions for new trial. l1 If granted, the prosecution can make no
appeal of the order. 12 District judges are accorded such latitude
in ruling upon motions for new trial because their personal observation at the trial facilitates the decision-making process.18
suggested new evidence is at best cumulative and would not be of sufficient import to
alter the jury's determination in this matter in terms of guilt or innocence." The government argued, apparently successfully, that the taped conversations sufficiently showed
the defendant's guilt, and that in comparison, the credibility of the witness was
insignificant.
7. ld. at 846.
8. FEn. R. CRIM. P. 33.
9. There are many grounds for motions for new trial. For example, jury misconduct,
misconduct of the prosecuting attorney, violation of the right to counsel, improper rulings on evidence. 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 33.03[4], at 33-16 to 33-17 (2d ed.
1980).
10. ld. 11 33.06[1], at 33-52.
11. 5 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 295 (1967).
12.ld.
13. Note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 316 (1955).
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This is especially true in the case of motions for new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence, in which the district judge
must determine the effect of the newly discovered evidence on
the jury's verdict. I" The scope of appellate review is limited to a
determination of whether the district judge abused his or her
discretion in ruling upon the motion.11I
Courts seldom grant motions for new triall6 because, in the
interest of finality, district judges avoid granting costly retrials
unlikely to result in a different verdict.17 This is especially true
if the newly discovered evidence consists of perjured or recanted
testimony. IS The typical case involves a recantation of testimony
by a material government witness who was the defendant's accomplice.19 District judges are reluctant to believe recantations
by accomplices because of the disincentives for accomplices to
admit testifying falsely and the likelihood of bribery and collusion between the accomplice and the defendant.20 Thus, judges
are persuaded only by overwhelming evidence that the testimony at trial was faJse. Even if persuaded, judges hesitate to
grant new trials on the basis of recanted or perjured testimony
presented by defendants' accomplices. This is because the testimony may have been accorded little weight at trial since juries
may properly consider the credibility of an accomplice's
testimony.
District courts apply different standards for evaluating motions for new trial depending upon the grounds for the motion.
In general, the severiity of the standard varies inversely with the
14. [d.

15. [d. at 317.
16. 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 33.06 (2d ed. 1980). For historical support, see
L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 510, 511 (1947), which discusses the history of the motion, and notes that new trials were unknown at common law
until the 17th century.
17. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
909 (1964).
18. Perjured and recanted testimony cases present substantially similar issues, and
the courts regard these cases as being of one type. One commentator has suggested that
the only difference between perjured and recanted testimony is the practical consideration of proof. 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 33.05 (2d ed. 1980).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the
defendant's accomplice recanted his testimony by telling "a pack of lies" in the hopes of
helping his friend get parole.
20. 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 175 (1971).
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gravity of the misconduct at the trial. 21
The Berry Standard
In Berry v. Georgia,22 the Georgia Supreme Court set forth
a standard for new trial motions based upon newly discovered
evidence. The Berry standard requires that the defendant satisfy the court:
1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge
since the trial. 2nd. That it was not owing to want
of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d.
That it is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial were
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only-viz.;
speaking to facts, in relation to which there was
evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of
the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not
be granted if the only object of the testimony is
to impeach the character or credit of a witness. 28

The Larrison Standard

Many courts apply the Berry standard to motions for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence.24 A majority of the circuit courts, however, have applied a more liberal standard when
the newly discovered evidence involves perjured or recanted testimony. In Larrison v. United States,2G the standard was first
applied in a case involving recanted testimony. The Larrison
standard requires that a new trial be granted when:
(a) the court is reasonably well satisfied that the
testimony given by a material witness is false,
21. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d at 514.
22. 10 Ga. 511 (1851). In Berry, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor had unsuccessfully attempted to elicit an admission of guilt by means of deceit. The court denied the motion for new trial holding that the evidence did not meet the standard set
forth above, because it most likely would have been inadmissible at trial and "it established nothing." ld. at 528.
23. ld. at 527. (emphasis added).
24. E.g., United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1977) (failure of government
to locate witness, later available to testify); United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1972) (new evidence that witness previously unwilling to testify was now willing).
25. 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). In Larrison the material government witness recanted his entire testimony. The witness subsequently repudiated his recantation. The
court refused to believe that the trial testimony was false and consequently denied the
motion. But see United States v. De Sapio, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1970).
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(b) that without it, the jury might have reached
a different conclusion,
(c) that the party seeking the new trial was
taken by surprise when the false testimony was
given and was unable to meet it or did not know
of its falsity until after the trial. 28

The Larrison COUlt rejected the Berry requirement that motions for new trial be denied when the evidence is merely cumulative, or only SUPpOlts the same points raised at trial.2'1 The
Larrison standard differs from the Berry standard in that the
Larrison standard requires the district judge to determine
whether the jury might have reached a different conclusion if it
had not heard the false testimony. 28 The Berry standard, on the
other hand, requires the district judge to determine whether the
jury would probably reach a different conclusion, if the jury
heard the new testimony.29 The essential differences between the
two standards are: (1) the degree of certainty which the trial
judge must attach to the likelihood of a different verdict from
the jury; that is, that the jury might or would probably reach a
different verdict; and, (2) the· knowledge of the evidence which
the judge must impute to the jury. That is, under Larrison, the
judge does not impute knowledge of the false testimony, while
under Berry, the judge does impute knowledge of the testimony
and the knowledge that the prior testimony was perjured.so
26. [d. at 87-88. The Seventh Circuit subsequently limited the scope of the Larrison
standard in United States Y. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 327 U.S. 106 (1946), to apply in cases in which the testimony was proven false
or recanted. A majority of the circuit courts today apply the Larrison standard as modified by Johnson. See United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976) (recantation of
testimony by a material government witness); United States·v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1973) (perjured testimony by a material government witness); United States v. Briola, 465 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); United States v.
Smith, 433 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970) (recantation not believed); Newman v. United
States, 238 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956) (recantation of testimony); Gordon v. United States,
178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1949) (recantation of testimony), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950).
27. 24 F.2d at 87.
28. [d.
29. 10 Ga. at 527.
30. Several courts have noted a third difference between the two standards. See,
e.g., United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds,
327 U.S. 106 (1946). The Larrison standard refers to the original trial jury, while the
Berry standard refers to the future jury at the new trial. Both the Larrison and Berry
standards require the district judge to evaluate the impact of the new evidence on the
jury's verdict. Whether the judge considers the original or a future jury is of no practical
significance. The judge can only evaluate the hypothetical outcome by integrating his or
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These differences have only recently been addressed by the federal courts. SI Two trends have emerged-one limiting, and the
other expanding, the scope of the Larrison standard.
Several courts have criticized the Larrison standard in recent years. S2 In United States v. Stofsky,SS the Second Circuit
rejected the Larrison standard in favor of the Berry standard.
The Stofsky court noted that the Larrison standard is too
"seculative,"s, and if literally applied, would always result in a
new trial. slS The Stofsky court, however, limited its holding to
cases in which defendants do not allege government culpability
or knowledge in the use of the false testimony.S6 Noting previous
uncertainty regarding the application of the Berry standard, the
her observations of the original jury. The Ninth Circuit similarly took this position in
Krasny.
31. See notes 32 & 38 infra.
32. The Larrison standard has been criticized as lacking sufficient precedent. See
Note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 316 (1955). The courts have expressed their disfavor with the
Larrison standard by limiting the scope of the standard. This has been done in a number
of ways. Some courts apply the standard only in cases in which the government has
knowingly or negligently used the false testimony. E.g., United States v. Curran, 465
F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1972). Other courts apply the standard only in cases in which the
testimony relates to an essential element of the crime. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 528
F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976). One court has held that the Larrison standard should be applied only when the motion for new trial,is brought within seven days of the final judgment. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 991 (1975).
33. 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert: denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). In Sto/sky, a
factually interesting case, a leading government witness, defendant's accomplice, lied at
trial to avoid revealing the source of personal assets subject to tax liability. The government was excused from culpability for negligent use of the perjured testimony because
the witness had transactional immunity, and it was not foreseeable by the government
that the witness would lie under the circumstances. The court denied the motion because
the new evidence was not exculpatory, and could have supported defendant's conviction.
34. [d. at 245. The court referred to the Larrison standard as too speculative, without explaining what this criticism meant. This commentator believes that the Stofsky
court meant that the standard allows district judges to exercise excessive discretion in
ruling upon motions for new trial.
35. [d. at 245-46 ("[TJhe test, if literally applied, should require reversal in cases of
perjury with respect to even minor matters, especially in light of the standard jury instruction that upon finding that a witness had deliberately proferred false testimony in
part, the jury may disregard his entire testimony.").
36. [d. at 243. The court cited two lines of cases in which the Berry standard has
been modified in favor of the lesser Larrison standard: (I) government culpability in the
suppression of evidence cases, and (2) perjured testimony cases. The Sto/sky court rejected the modification for perjured testimony cases but not government suppression
cases. The court did not state the basis for this distinction. Nor did the court state in
which category it would consider cases involving government culpability or negligence in
the use of perjured testimony by a government witness.
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court clarified the proper procedure. The district judge is to appraise the factual impact of the new testimony on the jury's determination as well as the impeaching aspects of the tesimony.37
The Larrison standard does not permit the judge to consider the
impact of the new testimony on the credibility of the witness.
Other courts have expanded the scope of the Larrison standard. 3s Most recently, in United States v. Willis,39 a Pennsylvania district court modified the Larrison standard to its
most liberal version yet. The Willis court changed the element
of the Larrison standa.rd that requires the judge to appraise the
impact on the jury's verdict as if it had not heard the false testimony."o Under Willis, the judge must appraise the impact of the
new testimony on the jury's verdict as well as the effect of the
new testimony on the credibility of the witness.
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS: ADOPTION OF THE Berry Standard
Because the case was one of first impression,"1 the Krasny
court reviewed the other circuits' standards for motions for new
trials based on perjUlced testimony. Following the Second Cir37. Id. at 246. The Second Circuit stated that this aspect of the Berry standard has
not been the subject of "explicit judicial reported consideration." Id. However, this aspect is addressed by the Berry standard itself. The last element of the standard provides
that a "new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the
character or credit of a witness." 10 Ga. at 527 (emphasis added). A fortiori, because the
standard states that the evidence may not be used for impeachment, the Berry court
obviously contemplated that the new evidence could be used for impeachment.
38. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278 (4th Cir. 1973) (district court
could properly look at all circumstances surrounding a recantation when ruling upon
motions for new trial based on perjured testimony); United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D.
157 (D.N.J. 1962) (the function of the trial judge is not to decide what the verdict should
finally be, but rather to determine whether the newly discovered evidence should be submitted to the jury).
39. 467 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1978), vacated and indictment dismissed on request of U.S. Attorney's Office, 606 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1979) (a government agent falsified
a surveillance report and gave perjured testimony regarding the report at trial).
40. "That without it, the jury might have reached a different conclusion." 24 F.2d at
87. The Willis court noted that this change was made in light of the jury instruction to
the effect that upon finding that a witness testified falsely in part, it may choose to
disregard his or her entire testimony. It should be noted that the Willis holding may be
limited to cases involving government culpability because the witness was a government
agent.
41. The court distinguished two prior Ninth Circuit cases as involving different legal
issues: Mejia v. United States, 291 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant recanted confession of guilt), and Strangway v. United States, 312 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 903 (1963) (testimony of the witness was held not be perjured, even though it was
inconsistent with her tax returns and established a basis for a perjury prosecution).
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cuit's decision in United States v. Stofsky,42 the court adopted
the Berry standard, rejecting the application of the Larrison
standard in cases involving perjured or recanted testimony if the
government did not knowingly or negligently use the false
testimony.4s
The Krasny court based its criticism of the Larrison standard on the reasoning in Stofsky. The· court argued that the
Larrison standard is speculative,44 and that applying the Larrison standard would necessarily require a new trial.... Unconvinced that all cases involving perjured testimony require new
trials, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Larrison standard.46 The
court also disapproved of those cases in which courts have applied both the Larrison and Berry standards"7
The Krasny court stated that it saw no reason to distinguish perjured or recanted testimony from other types of newly
discovered evidence!S The court stated that "[t]he focus of the
inquiry [should be] on what difference the evidence would have
made to the trial regardless of its source. "49
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Krasny from several other
types of cases involving perjured testimony. The court first distinguished Krasny from cases in which defendants alleged government culpability or negligence,l5o although the court cited no
basis for this distinction. The Krasny court next distinguished
the Supreme Court case of Mesarosh v. United States,151 an in42. 527 F.2d 237 (2nd Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See notes 33-35
supra and accompanying text.
43. 607 F.2d at 844-45.
44. See note 34 supra.
45. See note 35 supra.
46. 607 F.2d at 844.
47. ld. at 843 (citing United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977»;
United States V. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973). See also United States V. Jackson,
579 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United States V. Mackin, 561
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977).
48. 607 F.2d at 844.
49.ld.
50.. ld. at 844-45. In Krasny, no allegation of government knowledge or negligent use
was made, because the government "with commendable candor" advised the defendant's
attorney of the possible perjury by its witness, only six months after the final judgment
(well within the two year limit for new trial motions based upon newly discovered evidence). ld. at 842.
51. 352 U.S. 1 (1956). Compare Mesarosh with Communist Party of the United
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veterate perjurer case. In Mesarosh, the Supreme Court held
that a conviction based on perjured testimony required a new
trial. II2 The Krasny court distinguished Mesarosh on the ground
that the motion for new trial was not a rule 33 motion, but
rather a motion by the Solicitor General.lls
The Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ely rejected the majority's
adoption of the stricter Berry standard, arguing that Mesarosh
required the application of the more liberal "time-honored""
Larrison standard. Quoting Chief Justice Warren:
[The chief prosecution witness], by his [tainted]
testimony, has poisoned the water in the reservoir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without
first draining it of all impurity. . . . [The court
must] see that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here, the condition should be remedied at the earliest possible
opportunity.nil

Judge Ely stated that in light of the witness' perjury, the jury
might well have belioved the defendant's defense of duress and
acquitted the defendant. Judge Ely thus concluded that the conviction should have been vacated and the case remanded for new
trial. lI11
D.

CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Krasny typifies an emergent
trend by a growing minority of the circuits which reject the Larrison standard.II'l The Krasny court's criticism of the Larrison
standard is well takEm. The Larrison standard has been viewed
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956). These cases involved
testimony by a material government Witness which was entirely discredited by previous
trial perjury involving similnr matters.
52. In Mesarosh, the false testimony was presented by a paid informer in the employ of the government.
53. Mesarosh can be distinguished from Krasny on other grounds: (1) the witness in
Krasny was not a paid government informer, but rather an accomplice; (2) the testimony
of the witness was discredited only in part, and did not directly relate to the defendant's
conduct.
54. 607 F,2d at 846-47.
55. [d. at 847 (quoting Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. at 14).
56. 607 F.2d at 847.
57. See note 32 supra.
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as being the more liberal standard for motions for new trial, but
its practical effect is just the reverse. Although the Krasny court
argued that a literal application of the Larrison standard would
necessarily result in a new trial, ISS application of the Larrison
standard results in fewer successful motions for new trial.
Motions for new trial based on perjured or recanted testimony are seldom granted, regardless of the standard employed.lSs
Orders denying motions for new trial based on the Larrison
standard are less likely to be reversed on appeal, however, than
those based on the Berry standard. Appellate courts may review
district judges' orders only for an abuse of discretion in applying
the proper standard. Appellate courts rarely decide whether the
district judge has abused his or .her discretion in circuits applying the Larrison standard. Appellate courts are precluded from
making this decision by two factors: (1) the failure of district
judges to state explicit factual determinations for their decisions
on motions for new trials; and, (2) the nonappealable element of
the Larrison standard requiring proof of the false testimony
before application of the other elements.6o Because district
judges rarely state the factual basis for their determinations on
motions for new trial, reversal is unlikely unless a blatant error
has been made. Nearly every motion for new trial is denied in
circuit courts that apply the Larrison standard because the trial
testimony is found not perjured or the recantation of the testimony is not believed.61 A finding that the testimony was not
perjured is not reviewable unless wholly unsupported by the evidence. 62 Thus, the Larrison standard effectively enables a dis58. See note 34 & 35 supra.
59. Only six motions for new trial based on perjured testimony have been successful:
United States v. Willis, 467 F. Supp. 1111 (D.C. Pa.), vacated and indictment dismissed
on request of u.S. Attorney's Office, 606 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1979), and see note 39 supra
and acccompanying text; United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976), and see
note 38 supra; United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying both Berry
and Larrison standards); Newsome v. United States, 311 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying a hybrid Berry-Larrison standard requiring new trial if the new testimony raised a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt); United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D. 157
(D.N.J. 1962) (Larrison standard applied); Pettine v. New Mexico, 201 F. 489 (8th Cir.
1912).
60. See note 26 supra.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970); Newman v.
United States, 238 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956). Even Larrison turned on this issue. See note
25 supra.
62. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946).
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trict judge to deny motions for new trial with little chance of
appellate reversal.
The Krasny cowt properly rejected the Larrison standard,
but for unpersuasive reasons. The court cited Stofsky's reasoning that the standard is too speculative, but failed to explain
what this criticism means.6S
The Krasny COUlt'S rejection of the Larrison standard only
in cases in which gov·ernment culpability or negJ4gence is not alleged is inconsistent with the court's criticisms of the Larrison
standard. Following the reasoning in Krasny to its logical extreme, all cases alleging government culpability or negligence
would necessarily require new trials. This dictum indicates a departure from prior Ninth Circuit cases involving government
culpability.64
The Ninth Circuit failed to state the reason for distinguishing between perjured testimony cases which allege government
culpability from other perjured testimony cases. The effect of
the perjured testimolny on the accused is the same regardless of
government knowledge of the false testimony. Nor did the Ninth
Circuit state why it preferred the Berry standard over the Larrison standard, except that it saw no difference between perjured testimony and other types of newly discovered evidence.611
The Berry standard does not present the problems on appeal that the Larrison standard presents. It is a workable standard capable of iIl.dividual application in factually varying
cases.66 The Berry standard, however, is similar to the Larrison
standard in that district judges frequently fail to apply the elements of the standard to the facts of the case.67 The factual determinations of district judges are usually mere conclusionary
statements. The Krasny court correctly remanded the case to
the district judge fo!' an explicit factual determination of the ba63. See note 34 supra.
64. See United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Chisum, 436 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1971).
65. 607 F.2d at 844.
66. See note 24 supra for a variety of fact situations in which the Berry standard
has been applied.
67. See note 6 supra. r£he lower court opinion in Krasny is typical of the way district judges have ruled upon motions for new trial.
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sis for the denial of the motion for new trial.68 The Ninth Circuit
also gave recommendations to the district court relating to the
issues to be considered by the district judge.69 This will be helpful to district judges in future perjured or recanted testimony
cases.
The dissenting opinion supporting the Larrison standard
was as unpersuasive as the majority opinion. Judge Ely incorrectly relied on the reasoning of Mesarosh as support for the
Larrison standard, ignoring the practical results of the standard
which indicate that Larrison is not the more liberal standard.
E.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit was correct in adopting a more workable
standard than the Larrison standard. The reasoning supporting
the decision in Krasny, however, was weak. The court did not
explain why the Berry standard was superior to the Larrison
standard, nor did it clarify the difference between Krasny and
other cases involving perjured testimony which allege government culpability.
The Krasny decision will have the practical effect of allowing the defendant to choose which standard he or she desires
to be applied. If the perjured testimony can be readily shown,
the defendant will allege government misconduct-thereby obtaining a greater chance of success on the motion with the application of the Larrison standard. If, however, the perjured testimony cannot be readily shown, the defendant will stand a
greater chance of success if he or she fails to allege government
misconduct with the application of the Berry standard. When
this happens, the Ninth Circuit will have to address this dichot68. 607 F.2d at 846.
[The district court] will need to consider, among other things,
the importance of [the witness'] testimony to the government's case, the extent to which the apparently perjured testimony concerned material issues in the case, and the extent to
which her credibility, as a whole would be affected by the
relevation to the jury of this apparent perjury.

69.

ld.
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omy and the substantive differences between these types of
cases.

Jill A. Schwendinger*

IV. NO EXTENSION OF JENCKS ACT TO SUPPRESSION
HEARING OR SURVEILLANCE NOTES, BUT EXPANDED BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Bernard! the Ninth Circuit held that

the Jencks ActS does not apply to pre-trial suppression hearings
* Second Year Student, Loyola University School of Law.
1. 623 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Kilkenny, J. and ¥derson, J., revising, 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.
1979».
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) provides:
Demands for production of statements and reports of
witnesses
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States, no statement or report in the possession of the United
States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be
the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said
witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the
case.
(b) After Ii witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the
defendant, order the United States to produce any statement
(as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the
United States which relates to the subject matter as to which
the witness baa testified. H the entire contents of any such
statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the
witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the
defendant for his exanlination and use.

(d) H the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to
the defendant any such statement, or such portion thereof as
the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the
court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require thnt a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term "statement", as used in subsections (b),
(c), and (d) of this section in relation to any witness called by
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and that probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of officers working in close concert. The court revised its
prior position that the Jencks Act requires exclusion of a government agent's trial testimony because the agent destroyed rough
surveillance notes after he wrote a final report.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) learned through an
informant that defendant Bernard and two others would be
purchasing chemicals to manufacture methamphetamine. This
information was supported by Bernard's subsequent purchases
of chemicals on four occasions.
DEA agents, on the day of the arrest, followed one of the
defendants to a camper in a mobile home park where the defendant met with other people who were in separate vehicles. The
agents then followed the vehicles to a state park. The camper
parked while the other vehicles criss-crossed the park in an antisurveillance move. From the air, agents observed boxes being
moved into the camper.
A DEA agent testified that he saw two people leave the
camper and drive away from the state park. About ten minutes
later they returned and the agents overheard them report to the
others in the camper that the park was staked out. The agent
testified that he thought he smelled something "cooking," but
didn't make the connection between the smell and the
methamphetamine. About the same time, the agent observed a
person rush out of the camper "gasping, breathing deep" and
"shaking his head,"a in what the agent thought was an attempt
to get fresh air.
About ten mintues later, the agent reported these observathe United States, means (1) a written statement made by said witness and
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by
said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the
making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a
transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a
grand jury.
3. 623 F.2d at 554.
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tions to another agent. The agents concluded the camper was
being used to manufacture drugs. The principal investigating
agent arrived about aJrl hour later. He was told about the observations made during the day including the conclusion that the
camper was being used to manufacture drugs, but not about the
choking incident, the smell, or the conversation about the park
being staked out. Based on that information and information
from a prior investigation, the principal agent ordered a warrantless arrest. A subsequent search of the camper produced evidence of drugs.
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence as fruits of an
arrest unsupported by probable cause. The district court ruled
that under the Jenck£1 Act, the DEA agent's testimony regarding
the choking incident, the overheard conversation, and the smell
had to be stricken both at the suppression hearing and at trial
because rough surveillance notes had been destroyed after the
final report was made. Without the agent's testimony, there was
insufficient information for probable cause."
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding (1) that the agent's testimony was admissable at the pre-trial suppression hearing because the Jencks Act applies only to the trial; (2) that rough
surveillance notes are distinguishable from rough interview notes
and are not required. for production under the Jencks Act; (3)
that probable cause need not rest solely on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge; and (4) that the "collective knowledge" of
all the officers was Bufficient to constitute probable cause and
need not have been ·communicated.
The court focusE~d on two major issues: (1) the scope of the
Jencks Act both as to its application to the pre-trial suppression
hearing and as to the meaning of "statements" under the Act;
and (2) "collective knowledge" as a basis for probable cause.
B.

BACKGROUND

The Jencks Act
The Jencks Act regulates the production of prior witness
statements in the goyernment's possession during a federal crim4. [d. at 560.
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inal prosecution. The Act was passed in reaction to Jencks v.
United States,1$ which held that a defendant is entitled to statements within the government's possession if the defendant's request was for fairly specific statements made by the witness.
Congress narrowed the scope of the Jencks decision through a
time requirementS and a rigorous definition of "statements.''7
The Act provides tliat at trial after a witness' direct testimony, the defendant may demand production of the witness'
prior statements and reports if they are material to the witness'
testimony. If the government claims all or part' of the statement
is immaterial to the witness' testimony, the court may either order production, or grant the government an in camera inspection. The court may excise the immaterial portions and order
the rest delivered to the defendant. If the defendant objects to
the withholding of the statements, the court may order the excised portion preserved for appeal. If the government "elects not
to comply"8 with the court order, the court may apply sanctions
against the government either by striking the witness' testimony, or by declaring a mistrial. Sanctions have been applied
when the government has lost or destroyed statements, even if
the loss or destruction was in good faith or negligent.9
Only certain staements are producible under the. Jencks
Act. The Supreme Court has held that the producible statements are limited to those listed in the Act.10 Under the Jencks
Act a "statement" is: (1) a written statement "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" by the witness,11 (2) a recording
"which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously,"12 or (3)
a statement made by the witness to a grand jury.18
5. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 35OO(a) (1976).
7. ld. § 35OO(e).
8. ld. § 35OO(d).
9. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harrison,
524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
10. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (1) (1976).
12. ld. § 3500(e)(2).
13. ld. § 3500(e)(3).
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Collective Knowledge Probable Cause

"Collective knowledge" probable cause, or "the fellow officer
rule," allows an arrest to be valid even though the arresting officer did not personally acquire or is not personally possessed of
all the underlying facul and circumstances amounting to probable cause. There seom to be two sources of "collective
knowledge" probable cause: United States v. Romero,14 and
Whiteley v. Warden. llI
In Romero,16 the ICOurt held that officers working together
could pool their knowledge to arrive at probable cause. The officers were working as a team and were allowed to rely upon
each other's communi(:ated information.
In Whiteley,I" the court stated in dicta that police may arrest in reliance upon radio bulletins of valid warrants. The case
has come to stand for allowing arrests to be made without communication of the underlying facts and circumstances constituting probable cause if the arrest is made under a directive or
request.
14. 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957).
15. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
16. In Romero, several officers were working together on the investigation. One officer met with the defendant to arrange for the sale of cocaine while two officers observed
from a building across the street. All the officers met at another officer's car parked down
the street when the bag of cocaine was delivered in exchange for marked currency. The
officers conducted a field test to see if the bag contained an opium derivative. It did.
FoUr of the defendants were arrested immediately. Two others were arrested after further observation. The court held that "where the agents were working together and in
cooperation were observing the activities of the various participants and informing each
other of the progress of the conspiracy, the knowledge of each was the knowledge of all."
249 F.2d at 374.
17. In Whiteley, the Sheriff of Carbon County, Wyoming received a tip about
Whiteley and Dailey and a breaking and entering crime. The Sheriff signed a compulsory
complaint upon which a justice of the peace issued a warrant. The warrant was then
broadcast across the state along with a description of the two men and their car. A policeman in Laramie heard the broadcast and arrested the two described persons. The
court concluded that the arrest warrant was invalid because it was based on a
conclusionary complaint, and that there was an insuffiCient showing that the Sheriff or
the Laramie police had enough information to reasonably believe the defendants were
connected with the crime.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Jencks Act and the Pre-trial Suppression Hearing
The Ninth Circuit held that the Jencks Act does not apply
to suppression hearings because the Act limits production of
statements and reports to when the witness has testified on direct examination in "the trial of the case. "18 The court also held
that "trial of the case" means the actual trial and noted that
other circuits are in accord. l9 The court rejected the defendants'
argument that Congress would have considered the pre-trial
suppression hearing to be a trial or an integral part of the trial
had they thought about it.20 The court stated it was not within
its function "to engraft on a statute additions which we think
the legislature logically might or should have made."21
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that restricting the operation of the Jencks Act to trial only subverts
the decision of" Brady v. Maryland. 22 In Brady, the Supreme
Court held that the refusal of the prosecution to hand over evidence which might exonerate the defendant or lessen his punishment was a denial of due process. Brady applies only to certain
types of evidence: that which goes to guilt or innocence, or to
punishment. The Bernard court reasoned that Brady is an independent foundation for the production of documents and was
not meant to overrule the Jencks Act. The court stated that
Brady may apply to some pre-trial hearings;28 but not to the
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976).
19. 623 F.2d at 556 n.15 (citing United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022
(1970».
.
20. Defendants relied upon the dissent in United States v. Spagnuolo, 515 F.2d 818
(9th Cir. 1975).
21. 623 F.2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605
(1941).
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the defendant admitted at trial that he participated in the robbery charged, but claimed his companion committed the murder. He
sought a verdict without capital punishment. Brady and his companion, in separate
trials, were both found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Prior to
trial, Brady's counsel asked the prosecution to see the companion's extrajudicial statements. The prosecution offered some statements but withheld one where the companion
confessed doing the actual killing. This statement did not surface until Brady had been
tried, convicted, sentenced, and his conviction affirmed. The court held that Brady was
denied due process by the prosecution's withholding of the confession and that he was
entitled to a new trial on the issue of punishment.
23. 623 F.2d at 557 n.19.
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pre-trial suppression hE~arings because such hearings focus on
the issue of probable cause, not on guilt or punishment.24

Rough Surveillance Notes as Jencks Act Statements
In its original opillion,25 the court held that surveillance
notes were potentially lproducible statements under the Jencks
Act, but in the revised opinion, the court held that surveillance
notes were not statemellts and no sanctions need be applied for
their destruction. The court felt that the Harris-Robinson28 rule,
which holds that the destruction of rough interview notes
amounts to a usurpation of judicial discretion in determining
which statements need to be produced, should not be extended
to rough surveillance notes. The court decided that it would be
too broad a reading of the Jencks Act to say that surveillance
notes were "adopted or approved"2'1 by the witness or "substantially verbatim recordillgs."28
In distinguishing hetween the two kinds of notes, the court
found that rough interview notes tend to be factual only and are
completed during the interview, while surveillance notes tend to
be impressionistic and conclusionary as well as "sketchy and incomplete" and may not have been written contemporaneously.29
The court agreed with the government's argument that "[s]uch
cursory notes can not accurately be described as being 'adopted
or approved' by the agent since they are incomplete and not in
context. "80

The court also held that there were policy reasons for not
allowing surveillance ]tlotes to be Jencks Act statements. The
court looked to the legislative history of the Jencks Act as detailed in Palermo v. United States. 81 The Supreme Court stated
24. Id. at 556-57 (citing McCray v. Dlinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967».
25. 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979).
26. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976).
27. 623 F.2d at 557-58 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 35OO(e)(I) (1976».
28. Id. (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (2) (1976».
29. 623 F.2d at 557-58.
30. Id. at 557.
31. 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 1'he day after the Jencks decision, the House of Representatives was told by the Attorney General that the decision posed serious national security
problems and that legislation should be introduced. On the same day the first of eleven
bills dealing with the problem was introduced. The Jencks Act was passed three months
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that one of the prime motivating forces behind passage of the
Act was a fear that an expansive reading of the recent decision
in Jencks v. United States 32 would result in the disclosure of
"the investigative agent's interpretations and impressions. "33
The court reasoned that the disclosure of the statements would
be harmful to the national interest because the "inner workings
of the investigative process"34 would be revealed. The statements would also be used unfairly against the agent for impeachment. The Bernard court reasoned that surveillance notes
were the type of interpretive and impressionary memoranda that
Congress intended to protect from discovery.35

Collective Knowledge Probable Cause
Although the court found that the arresting officer did not
have sufficient specific knowledge for probable cause, the court
reasoned that there was sufficient "collective knowledge" among
the agents to constitute probable cause. The court found that
the decision to arrest was, in effect, a joint decision. The arresting officer had "relied 'to a great degree' "36 on the opinion of
the other agents and it was not necessary that the substance of
the information be communicated to him.
To support this position, the court cited Whiteley v. Warden.37 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the DEA agent acted
like the officer who acts on a police bulletin. In both cases probable cause is based on a lack of specific knowledge, reliance on
uncommunicated observations and knowledge of. other officers.
D.

CRITIQUE

The Jencks Act and the Pre-trial Suppression Hearing
The holding of the Ninth Circuit to not compel production
of Jencks Act statements at the suppression hearing is in accord
later. Congress was concerned that the Jencks decision not be interpreted to allow fishing expeditions by defendants through government files, that the statements should not
be given to the defendant until the witness had testified, and that the Jencks Act should
not be used as a discovery device.
32. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
33. 360 U.S. at 350.
34.Id.
35. 623 F.2d at 558.
36. Id. at 560.
37. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
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with current judicial thought. There is, however, some dicta suggesting that a judge should be allowed discretion in compelling
production of Jencks Act statements at pre-trial hearings under
certain circumstances.sa The majority of cases have limited production to the actual tlrial.S9 This limitation is based upon: (1)
the statutory language limiting production until "after the witness 'has testified on direct examination in the trial of the
case";40 (2) legislative history where Congress expressed a concern about pre-trial disclosure of government files;41 and (3) case
law interpreting the statutory language to mean the actual
trial. 42
The construction of the statutory lapguage "trial of the
case" to mean the actual trial, follows from the designation of
certain proceedings as "pre-trial,"4s and therefore, not the trial.
Case law supports this strict construction of "trial. "44 The suppression hearing is generally considered to be pre-trial.
Congressional intent has also been generally interpreted to
mean the actual trial, but language in the legislative history is
ambiguous. "[I]t is tho specific intent of the bill to provide for
the production of statements, reports, transcriptions or record38. United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 879 (1969)
(affirming denial of disclosure at pre-trial suppression hearing as a function of judicial
discretion rather than as a matter of law); United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252
(D.C. Mich. 1976) (due to complexity of the case and the number of witnesses, strict
adherence to schedule'imposed by Jencks Act for disclosure would unreasonably delay
the trial; therefore, disclosure was compelled pre-trial).
39. In the following cases production was denied at pre-trial hearings: United States
v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.) (suppression hearing), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 955
(1978); United States v. Spanguola, 515 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975) (suppression hearing);
United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1974) (suppression hearing); United
States v. Polesti, 489 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1973) (suppression hearing), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975); Robbins v. United· States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973) (preliminary
hearing); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.) (suppression hearing), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976).
41. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 1861, 1861.
42. United States V. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States V.
Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) (2), for example, provides that: "Defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information
other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be
raised only by motion before trial." (Emphasis added.)
44. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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ings, as described in the bill after the Government witness has
testified against the defendant on direct examination in open
court, and to prevent disclosure before such witness has testified. "45 This language leaves open the possibility that "trial of
the case" could be interpreted as the "court proceedings of the
case" which would include the suppression hearing. Other trial
rights have been accorded the criminal defendant at the suppression hearing such as the right to counsel and the right to
cross examination.
Because the statements are not producible until the witness'
cross examination, their primary use is for impeachment.46 This
impeachment use is as relevant to the suppression hearing as to
the actual trial. It has been argued that failure to require production of the prior statements at the suppression hearing unduly interferes with the defendant's ability to cross-examine and
impeach the government's witnesses.47 The government's interests in limiting disclosure to the trial only, fail to consider
whether the defendant's rights will be fully protected. Furthermore, there may be no benefits gained by the government by
limiting disclosure (such as speeding up the criminal justice system)48 because: (1) suppression issues are rarely relitigated; (2)
some of the witnesses who testify at the suppression hearing do
not testify at the trial; and (3) there may be no trial at all because defendants often choose to plead guilty once evidence is
found admissible against them.48
Under Brady v. Maryland,5o the defense is entitled to statements in the government's possession which go to the defendant's guilt or punishment. The use of such statements is primarily for substantive use. The· Ninth Circuit has required a
showing of prejudice before allowing Brady to override the
Jencks Act. 51 This strict application of the Jencks Act is logical
given Congress' statement that "[t]he purpose of this proposed
45. s. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Seas. 1, 2, reprinted in [1957] 2 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1861, 1863 (emphasis added).
46. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, '349 (1959).
47. Onley, Expanding Defendant's Discovery: The Jencks Act at Pretrial Hearings,
24 BUFFALO L. REv. 419, 428-29 (1975).
48. Id. at 427.
49. Id. at 429.
50. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
51. Thomas v. Cardwell, 626 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980).
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legislation is. . . to provide for the exclusive procedure for handling demands for the production of statements and reports of
witnesses. "G2 The exclusivity of the Jencks Act was affirmed in
Palermo v. United States. GS
A change in poli(!y is desirable, but unlikely to come
through the judiciary. The Supreme Court set the tone for
Jencks Act interpretation:
In almost eve~J enactment there are gaps to be
filled in and ambiguities to be resolved by judicial
construction. This statute is not free from them.
Here, however, the detailed particularity with
which Congress has spoken has narrowed the
scope for needful interpretation to an unusual degree. The statute clearly defines procedure and
plainly indicates the circumstances for their
application.M

The courts of appeals, following the Supreme Court's lead, have
strictly construed the Act.
The Second Circuit has both criticized the Jencks Act production limitationGG and encouraged voluntary cooperationG6 by
the government in the same cases where it has strictly construed
the Act. Change will, therefore, come from Congress, and not the
judiciary.

Rough Surveillance Notes as Jencks Act Statements
On the basis that Jencks Act statements are primarily useful for impeachment, the Ninth,G'7 D.C.,GS and ThirdG9 Circuits
have required the preservation of rough interview notes in addi52. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. I, 4, reprinted in [1957) 2 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1861, 1861 (emphasis added).
53. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
54. Palermo V. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
55. United States V. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1970). The court stated
it might prefer, as a matter of policy, to uphold production at the suppression hearing,
but believed it could not ignore the weight of authority to the contrary.
56. United States V. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1974). The court encouraged Jencks Act problems to be worked out in pre-trial conferences, but held statement need not have been produced at the pre-trial hearing.
57. United States V. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976); United States V. Harris,
543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
59. United States V. Vella, 562 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1977).
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tion to the final interview report. These Circuits have held that
the routine destruction of such notes denies the court the opportunity to review the material and to decide whether or not they
are statements to be compelled for production, that it is a
Jencks Act violation not to produce them, and that sanctions
may be imposed for failure to produce.60
The impeachment use of rough notes is based upon the possibility "that the agent who adopts a final report from preliminary memoranda will tailor his observations to fit his conclusion."61 The possibility of distortion is also present in the
making of a final report from rough surveillance notes. Indeed,
distortion may be more likely to occur under those
circumstances. 62
60. The following cases held that there is no Jencks Act violation if rough interview
notes are destroyed in good faith: United States v. Martin, 565 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. An2alone, 555 F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015
(1977); United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 773 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Smaldone, 544 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1976); United States
v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1292 (7th Cir. 1976); Hayes v. United States, 329 F.2d 209, 220
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964) (defendant must show notes are inconsistent
with report); United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180, 202 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 383 U.S. 169
(1964).
61. 543 F.2d at 1251 (quoting United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2c1372, 377 (9th Cir.
1976».
62. The following quotation from Harrison seems applicable to rough surveillance
notes:
It is obvious, however, that even the most conscientious agent
can err, despite careful training and despite his rechecking the
the report against the notes before destroying the latter.
Moreover there are certain factors peculiarly conducive to error where as in this case, the notes contain key identifying
data provided by eyewitness. As we stated in Bundy [472 F.2d
1266, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1972)]:
["]The initial description of an assailant by the victim or other
eyewitness is crucial evidence, and the notes taken of that
description should be kept and produced. The formal written
police report of the crime, does, of course, contain a description of the offender, but that report is often prepared after a
suspect is arrested and the danger that the description in the
formal report may be subconsciously influenced by the viewing
of the suspect by the author of the report is very great.["]
And certainly we cannot consider it beyond the bounds of possibility that a report be distorted because of ovenealousness
on the part of the agent preparing • . . since preparation of
the report and the decision whether or not to preserve the
notes are entirely within the discretion of a single agent acting
alone.
524 F.2d at 429-30 (citation omitted).
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The distinction malde by the Ninth Circuit between rough
interview notes and rough surveillance notes is weak. The court
based its distinction on the time and opportunity for recording
as well as the content. Because this was a case of first impression, the court looked to other circuits, and found United States
v. Lane,63 where the Tenth Circuit found surveillance notes not
to be Jencks Act statements. This finding was based largely on
the fact that the notes were not written contemporaneously with
the observations and were rather sketchy. Although the Lane
decision is not clear, tho court appears to have analyzed the surveillance notes under 18 U.S.C. section 3500(e)(2), which requires a recording to be a "substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously." This analysis is appropriate for interview notes, but
not for surveillance notes which should be analyzed under 18
U.S.C. section 3500(e)(l)'s "adopted or approved" standard. It is
also worth noting that the Tenth Circuit does not recognize the
need to apply sanction.8 for the destruction of rough interview
notes.64
The Ninth Circuit also looked to Palermo v. United
States65 for a definitioll of "statement." The Palermo court discussed the cOIJ,gression.al intent to not permit disclosure of an
agent's impression sUlIllmary. The Ninth Circuit appears to have
recognized that rough interview notes may contain impressionary matter and the court is prepared to excise portion. The court
seems to presume tha surveillance notes will consist entirely of
impressionary material and, therefore, should not be required
for production. This logic is weak.
The Palermo Court also considered how statements should·
be used if they "reflect fully and without distortion what was
said to the government agent."66 This passage focuses on Congress' emphasis on a "substantially verbatim recital" and "continuous narrative statoments"6'1 which reflects an analysis under
63. 574 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1978); but see United States v. Deleon, 498 F.2d 1327
(7th Cir. 1974) (surveillance notes found to be producible statements).
64. United States v. Smaldone, 544 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1976).
65. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
66. Id. at 352.
67.Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/7

44

Seitas et al.: Criminal Law

1981]

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE

197

18 U.S.C. section 3500(e)(2), which seems inappropriate for an
analysis of surveillance notes. It is not clear why the Ninth Circuit cited this language. It appears that the court is requiring
that a Jencks Act statement must meet both the "adopted and
approved" and the "substantially verbatim recital" standards,
even though the Act is clear that these standards apply to two
different types of statements.
In its original opinion, the Ninth Circuit analyzed surveillance notes uner 18 U.S.C. section 3500(e)(I)'s "adopted or approved" standard and held that the surveillance notes were
statements under the Jencks Act. The court reasoned that the
notes are the agent's own words and he "adopts" them when he
incorporates them into his final report. 6S

The court noted that it had given notice through its decisions in United States v. Harris 69 and United States v. Robinson'1O that the production of rough notes would be required. The
court rejected the government's contention that application of
the Harris-Robinson rule to surveillance notes would be retroactive because those cases applied only to rough interview notes.
"[T]here is nothing in either decision to indicate that the same
rule would not be applicable to rough notes in surveillance operations."7l The reasoning in the original opinion seems much
sounder than that of the revised opinion which held that surveillance notes are never Jencks Act statements.
"
Collective Knowledge Probable Cause

The Ninth Circuit has gone beyond either the Romero type
of probable cause or the Whiteley type of probable cause. The
arrest in Bernard was based neither on communicated knowledge nor on an order to arrest.
The court resorted to "collective knowledge" because it ad68. 607 F.2d at 1264 ("We conclude that a government agent's truncated personal
observation notes made at a surveillance site for incorporation in a later report falls
within this statutory definition. The notes are the agent's own words. They are
"adopted" by him in completing his report, and they constitute potentially discoverable
material that the defendants might use for impeachment purposes if the agent later testifies at trial.").
69. 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976).
70. 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. 607 F.2d at 1264.
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mitted that the agent authorizing the arrest lacked probable
cause.72 The court's finding that the decision to arrest was a collective one seems to be stretching the facts of the case. The arrest was not authorized until over an hour after the crucial observations were made. The principle investigating agent
authorized the arrest largely upon conclusionary information.
Probable cause should be founded on facts, not conclusions.
For support of its finding that collective knowledge can justify an arrest, the court cited United States v. Stratton.73 In
Stratton the court stated that the arresting officer himself need
not possess all the available information, but could rely upon the
collective knowledge of the investigative team. The court concluded that "[t]he officers involved were working in close concert
with each other and the knowledge of one of them was the
knowledge of all." This language of the "knowledge of one officer
is the knowledge of all" is found in many of the cases the court
cited. It is originally from Romero v. United States. 7 • As used in
the cases cited, the phrase was meant literally because the officers actually communicated their knowledge. Those courts held
that the officers were Elntitled to rely upon that communicated
information in determining probable cause.7 !>
72. 623 F .2d at 558.
73. 453 F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972). Secret service
agents were working at the request of the United States Attorney's office who had informed the agents that a warrant would be issued on November 27, 1970, the day of the
arrest, but due to the unavailability of the magistrate over the weekend, the warrant was
not issued until November 30th. The arrest then had to be analyzed as warrantless. This
situation is analogous to that in Whiteley.
74. 249 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1957).
75. United States v. Caraballo, 571 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1978) (custom agents
observed a boat carrying burlap bags thought to be marijuana, communicated this information to other custom agents who continued the surveillance and eventually made arrest); United States v. Rose, 541 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908
(1977) (sheriff conferred with prosecuting attorney about bank robbery to acquire
enough facts for probable cause to arrest defendants); United States v. Heisman, 503
F.2d 1284, 1290 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974) (secret service agents conducted surveillance of office
where they had, pursuant to search warrant, found evidence of l,>rinting of counterfeit
money including counterfeit money stored in a box with an apple on the top. When
defendant went into the office and came out with the box with ~ apple on it, he was
arrested. The arresting officer had not personally seen the box or its contents before, but
the information had been communicated to him and he was entitled to rely upon it);
Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970) (customs agent had tip from informant that defendant was involved in smuggling. This agent and another, to whom the information had been communicated, followed defendant, and eventually one of them arrested defendant at border patrol station
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The Bernard court recognized that in at least some of the
cases it cited, the substance of the information had been communicated to the other officers, but went on to state "[w]e do
not find, however, that this is required, particularly where, as
here, the agents were working in close concert."'16 The "close
concert" language has been used in several prior cases, but, in
those cases it was used only when the information was actually
communicated or when the officers involved were acting under
directives. The Ninth Circuit has extended the meaning of this
language when it interprets it to not require communication.
To strengthen its argument that the information need not
be communicated, the court cited Whiteley v. Warden,'1'1 where
in dictum the court said that police officers could base an arrest
upon a radio bulletin that an arrest warrant had been issued.
The Bernard panel analogized the reliance by officers upon a radio bulletin to the reliance of the principal investigating agent
on the other DEA agents' statements. But the Bernard court did
not decide whether the other :DEA agents' conclusions were
based on probable cause. If not, then this situation is like that in
Whiteley, where the court invalidated the arrest because the arrest warrant bulletin was not based on probable cause.'18
In his treatise on the fourth amendment,'19 Professor LaFave
addressed the Bernard-type situation:
The Whiteley type of case, in which there has
been a directive or request from another officer or
agency, must be distinguished from the situation
while the other agent was parked close by and in continual radio contact) ("[K]nowledge
in one sector of a police system can be availed of in another assuming some degree of
communication."); Strassi v. United States, 410 F.2d 946, 952 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969) (customs agents were working together to break up drug ring. One agent followed courier
from the border to a hotel where arrest took place. Actual arresting officer was working
under the direction of the customs agent) (Whiteley situation): United States v. Pitt, 382
F.2d 322, 324-25 (4th Cir. 1962) (police officer had a tip that the defendants were involved in distributing drugs. He communicated information about the tip as well as defendants' description to the officer who eventually arrested the defendant).
76. 623 F.2d 551, 56!.
77. 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971). Also cited was United States v. Gaither, 527 F.2d 456
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976), where an arrest upon a radio bulletin
of a warrant was held valid because the warrant was supported by probable cause.
78. 401 U.S. at 568-69.
79. 1 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 631
(1978).
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in which there has been no such directive or request but the arresting or searching officer attempts to justify his action on the ground the officers were in possession of the underlying facts
which would justify his action.

The arrest in Bernard was not based upon a directive or request.
Indeed, the arresting agent was the one who did the directing
and requesting. It is illogical to suggest that his reliance on uncommunicated information is like that of officers upon a warrant
bulletin. The directing or requesting approach of Whiteley was
based on the assumption that the person or agency doing the
directing or requesting had probable cause. The authorizing
agent in Bernard did not have probable cause.
The court has misused the "collective knowledge" concept.
The concept was intended as a means of passing along personal
knowledge or as a means of acting under the authority of those
who are possessed of probable cause. As used in this case, "collective knowledge" would allow an agency to make an arrest, and
then, after the fact, gather information to, see if collectively
there was enough knowledge for probable cause. Probable cause
should be a safeguard ngainst unreasonable seizure, a determination made prior to the seizure, not an after-the-fact justification.

E.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bernard has declined
to grant the criminal defend!IDt any additional discovery rights
under the Jencks Act while exposing the defendant to an expanded basis for finding probable cause to arrest.

Patricia A. Seitas*

V. THE EFFECT OF A GUILTY PLEA UNDER FEDERAL
FIREARMS LAVr
In United States v. Benson, l the defendant was convicted
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 605 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wright; the other panel members were Tuttle,
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for violating a federal statuteS prohibiting the receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon. Benson, the defendant, did not dispute that he had received a firearm,s but argued on appeal that
he had never been convicted of a felony.
Satisfaction of the prior conviction element of the offense
was based on defendant's guilty plea in 1974 to a charge of violating an lllinois controlled substance statute· and his subsequent sentence to thirty months of probation. The record of the
lllinois court did not indicate whether sentence was imposed
persuant to a judgment of conviction or in accordance with an
lllinois deferred prosecution statute.& The federal district court
believed Benson was prosecuted under the deferred prosecution
statute and that a judgment of conviction was never actually entered on the record. 6 Nevertheless, it held that, for purposes of
federal law, Benson had been "convicted."
On appeal the issue was whether Benson's prior "conviction" was within the purview of the federal statute.? In affirming
the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit held that federal
law controls in the determination of "conviction" for purposes of
this federal statute, and under federal law, a state court's acceptance of a guilty plea and a subsequent imposition of sentence constitute a "conviction." The prior conviction element of
D.J., sitting by designation, and Ely, J., concumng).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year
• • • to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
3. Benson, employed as a security guard, was required to carry a gun as part of his
work uniform. He borrowed a gun from a co-worker and returned it to a locker each day
at the end of his work shift. 605 F.2d at 1095 n.1.
4. Illinois Controlled Substance Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56~, § 1402 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979).
5. Id. § 1410. See also, id. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(c).
6. 605 F.2d at 1094 n.2.
7. Benson had previously entered a "conditional guilty plea" in the district court,
thereby reserving the right to appeal this issue. The Ninth Circuit held that conditional
guilty pleas were not recognized in this circuit. The court of appeals, however, vacated
Benson's conviction and allowed him to plead anew. 579 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978). See
also, Note, Appellate Review of Non-Jurisdictional Constitutional Infirmities After a
Plea of Guilty, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 235 (1979).
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the offense was satisfied; whether Benson was considered a convicted felon under Illinois law was irrelevant.
In a separate concurrence, Judge Ely explained that he felt
bound by precedent in the Ninth Circuit to concur, but denounced the result as a usurpation of the federal-state balance.s
B.

BACKGROUND

Originally enacted as part of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,9 18 U.S.C. section
922(h)(1) was signed into law as part of the Gun Control Act of
1968.10 The statute was designed to keep firearms out of the
hands of felons.u Although the statute explicitly defines a felon
as a a person "who has been convicted in any court of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," the
statute does not define the word "convicted."12 Courts have
wrestled with the question of what constitutes a conviction for
purposes of this statute,13 and the scant legislative history
reveals little that is helpful in determining what meaning Con8. See notes 61-69 infra and accompanying text.
9. Passed the Senate, May 24, 1968, 114 CONGo REC. 14889 (1968); passed the House
of Representatives, June 6, 1968, 144 CONGo REc. 16300 (1968). The bill was passed by
Congress on June 6, 1968, the day after the assassination of Robert Kennedy. Pub. L.
No. 90-351 (1968). The assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther
King have been seen as a strong force motivating the legislature to enact the measure.
See Zimmring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133 (1975).
10. The Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, became effective October 22,
1968, when signed into law by President Johnson. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1201-1203 (1976), a
last minute floor amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, was
enacted simultaneously with Title IV as part of the Gun Control Act. The provisions of
the two titles are substantially the same.
11. The Senate Report of the Judiciary Committee stated:
The principal pw-poses of Title VII are to aid in making it
possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally
entitled to possesll them because of age, criminal background,
or incompetency, and to assist law enforcement authorities in
the states . • . iu combatting the increasing prevalence of
crime in the United States.
S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1968) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2113.
12. The ambiguity makes the statute susceptible to different interpretations. One
common definition of "conviction" is simply a finding of guilt based upon a plea or verdict. Another definition requires the entry of a final judgment of conviction and sentence. See Holland, Conviction Defined, 40 J. ST. B. CAL. 36 (1965).
13. Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
326 (1976).
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tress intended the term to have. However, the provisions of the
Act have been expansively applied by the courts persuant to the
sweeping legislative goal of keeping firearms away from those
with criminal backgrounds.14
Generally, Congress intends its law to be uniformly interpretted and applied, and unless Congress clearly indicates a contrary intention, the presumption is that federal law will be governed by a federal standard to achieve uniformity.15 However,
where a federal law incorporates state law by reference the question raised is which law Congress intended to control.16 Title IV
is governed by 18 U.S.C. section 927, which indicates that Congress intended the federal statute to be interpretted harmoniously with state law, preempting state law only if there is a clear
conflict.!'1 Because section 922(h)(l) is dependent upon the individual states to define the predicate offense, prosecute the offender, and determine a sentence, it has been asserted that the
congressional intent was to leave the determination of the exis14. The Supreme Court has declared that the Act should be given a broad application. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (prior possession of firearm
sufficient for nexus between possession and commerce). See Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212 (1976); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974). A broad interpretation of the term "convicted" was specifically applied in United States v. Cody, 529 F.2d
564, 566 (8th Cir. 1976).
The broad reading of the statute conflicts with a general principle of statutory construction which mandates that "ambiguities concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis v. United states, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)
(citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955». See also United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347 (1971). However, the Supreme Court in Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S.
212 (1976), held that because the purpose of Congress was clear, there was no ambiguity
in § 922(h)(I). As a result, there was no need to resort to the rule that penal statutes are
to be strictly construed. [d. at 216.
15. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943).
16. This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in the context of a federal
tax law which was dependent upon a state definition of "real property" in Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946). Looking to the congressional purpose, the Court determined it could "best be accomplished by application of settled state
rules ..• so long as •.• [they] do not patently run counter to the temIS of the Act." [d.
at 210.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1970) provides:
No provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which
such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any
State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such provision and the law of the
State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently
stand together.
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tence of a prior conviction to the states.IS However, in the Ninth
Circuit the question has been settled in favor of federallaw. I9

United States v. Potts20 was the first of a series of decisions
which ultimately led to this conclusion. Potts held that a prior
conviction which had been expunged may be proved for the
federal firearms control statute.21 The Potts court determined
that the defendant's prior conviction, expunged under a Washington statute,22 had only been "partially erased."2s The majority did not conclude whether state or federal law controlled. Instead, the case turned on the precise wording of the state statute
which limited the scope of ~he expunction where there is a subsequent prosecution.2 <1 Judge Sneed concurred in the result in
1~. This is the current interpretation in the Tenth Circuit. See United States v.
Stober, 604 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1979), and notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
See United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297, 1309-10 n.26 (5th Cir. 1978) ("in Title IV,
by identifying those subject to the proscription of § 922(h)(i) as 'any person •.• who
has been convicted in any court • • .,' Congress chose to rely, at least in part, on state
criminal law. We see no reason, in either the language or legislative history of Title IV, to
doubt that Congress adopted the state's o~ definition of conviction, including the effects of a pardon thereon."). But see, United States v. Lehman, 613 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing United States v. Padia, 584 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1978).
19. See notes 20-38 infra and accompanying text.
20. 528 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
21. Potts was prosecuted for a violatio~ of § 1202(a) of Title VII of the Act.
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.240 (1977).
23. Potts overruled United States v. Hoctor, 487 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1973), which,
according to Potts, erroneously concluded that the former conviction "was absolutely
"no longer a person that had been convicted of a felony."
erased" and the defendant
528 F.2d at 884. See note 24 infra.
24. A more careful reading or"the statute in Potts reveals the statutory limitation
overlooked by the court in Hoctor: "Provided, That in any subsequent prosecution, for
any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved, and shall have the
same effect as if probation had not been granted, or the information or indictment dismissed." WASH. REv. CODE § 9.995.240 (1977).
In Potts the court declined to apply their decision retroactively to the defendant.
Judge Koelsch, writing for majority, explained,
Our decision today, overruling Hoctor, undoubtedly expands
the scope of potential criminal liability under § 1202(a)(1).
While Hoctor stood as the law of this circuit, a person such as
Potts whose sole prior felony conviction had been expunged
persuant to the Washington statute, could not reasonably'have
suspected that his possession of a firearm . • • would constitute a § 1202(11)(1) violation. As Potts lacked notice of our
subsequently revised view of the statute, "due process fairness
bars the retros.ctive judgment of his conduct using the expanded definition." Accordingly, the rule we announce today
must be applied prospectively only today.
528 F.2d at 886 (citations OInitted).

was
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Potts, but not on the basis of the construction of the state expunction statute. He argued that the court should look only to
the fact that the defendant had been convicted of a felony because state expunction statutes can only remove state disabilities and are ineffective under federal law.llli
Concurring in Potts, Judge Wright voiced his concern for those similarly situated
"whose Washington state convictions have been expunged, those 'presently on probation
under deferred or suspended sentences, and those who are about to bargain for deferment under Washington law. [d. at 887.
Because Benson could similarly not "reasonably have suspected" that his receipt of
a firearm would constitute a violation of the federal firearms law, one wonders why the
court did not apply their decision prospectively only in Benson, as was done in Potts.
The answer lies in footnote one of the majority opinion. "Benson's attack on the constitutionality of § 922(h)(1) 'is expressly foreclosed by our prior opinion in United States v.
Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 972-74 (9th Cir. 1977).''' In Haddad, the defendant argued that
§ 922(h)(1) was unconstitutionally vague because the wording of the statute did not
clearly state whether knowledge of receipt was an element. The court rejected this IU"gument, noting that other portions of § 922, for example 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1976), make
knowledge an element. The Haddad court held that "knowledge is not an element of the
crime, mere receipt is enough."
Haddad relied on an earlier case, United States v. Crow, 439 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir.
1971), vacated sub nom. Crow v. United States, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972), which held that
the knowing possession of a firearm was unlawful without regard to whether the defendant knew such possession was unlawful. In Crow, the defendant argued that he could
not be convicted for a violation of the law if he did not know it was unlawful to possess
the gun. 439 F.2d at 1195. The court rejected the argument because nowhere in the section does it say "knowingly" or "intentionally." It also rejected Crow's argument that his
conviction was foreclosed by Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Lambert involved a Los Angeles ordinance which required sex offenders to register within five days
after entering Los Angeles. Lack of knowledge in Lambert was found to be a valid defense because the challenged ordinance required affirmative action. Conviction for noncompliance was held to be a violation of due process. The court distinguished Crow from
Lambert:
First, merely passive conduct is not involved. To violate the
law, one must acquire knowing possession of a firearm; second,
when one is a convicted felon, one should in our opinion be
alert to the possible consequences. Thus the rule that is "deep
in our law" that ignorance of the law will not excuse is applicable here.
439 F.2d at 1196.
As to whether this holding also mean that knowledge is not an element where one
accused of a violation of the federal firearms law has no knowledge that he is a convicted
felon, see note 41 infra.
25. Judge Sneed reasoned that
state law must be examined to determine whether the defendant has been convicted of a felony. The relevant state law to
be examined in this determination does not include the expunction statutes. Such statutes do not rewrite history; they
merely provide that previous history is immaterial for certain
purposes under state law. It is not within the power of a state
to make such history immaterial to the administration of the
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The conflict between the majority opinion and Judge
Sneed's concurrence in Potts has resulted in confusion in subsequent cases. In United States v. Bergeman,26 the court announced the conflict had "been resolved in favor of both viewpoints. "27 The dissenlt charged that this meant only that the
issue had been given inconsistent treatment and the court had
"invoked both theories in later cases."28 However, the Bergeman
court recognized that in the Ninth Circuit an individual remains
subject to the federal restriction placed upon anyone convicted
of a felony, regardless of subsequent state procedures provided
to remove the disability. The Bergeman court concluded that
federal law controls. This determination was based upon an
analysis of Potts, as well as legislative history supporting a
broad interpretation of the term "convicted."29 Finally the opinion expressed the COltlCern that a contrary holding would result
in a "patchwork" application of federal law resulting from variations in state expunction statutes.30
Whether state Ol~ federal law controls was addressed in two
earlier Ninth Circuit cases,' United States v. Pricepaul,31 and
United States v. Locke.32 In Pricepaul the defendant argued
federal criminal law or the interpretation of federal criminal
statutes. Only Congress can do that.
528 F.2d at 887.
26. 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979). Bergeman held that expunction of a state conviction under an Idaho statute did not change the defendant's status as a convicted felon
for purposes of § 922(h)(1).
27. [d. at 535.
28. [d. at 538. In United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978), the court
applied the Potts majority analysis to determine the effect of an expunction statute.
Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1978) followed the Sneed analysis in Potts.
The Bergeman majority asserted that the conflict had been put to rest in Hyland, where
"the question of whether state or federal law would control a convicted felon's right to
carry a firearm was resolved in favor of federal law." 592 F.2d at 536. This statement
seems to contradict the earlier assertion that the conflict had been resolved "in favor of
both viewpoints." Resolution of these inconsistencies may be possible if the court follows
the Potts majority decision, by referring to state law to determine the existence of a
conviction, and following the Sneed concurrence only as to the irrelevance of state postconviction provisions. Judge Sneed's opinion admittedly relied on the intitial conviction
under applicable state law.
29. 592 F.2d at 537 n.9 (citing Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1978»
("The federal gun laws at issue here are intended to have, and should be given the
broadest permissable application.").
30. [d. at 537.
31. 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1976).
32. 542 F. 2d 800 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'g 409 F. Supp. 600 (D. Idaho 1976).
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that his predicate conviction was invalid under California law
and could not satisfy the prior conviction element of the federal
firearms statute. 3S The court held that the validity of the state
conviction did not depend upon compliance with a strict state
standard, as long as the conviction was valid under federal law.34
The Pricepaul court relied on Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Beaver CountySIS and the Sneed analysis in Potts S6 for its determination that the federal standard should be applied.37
In Locke,38 the issue on appeal was whether the prior conviction element of the federal firearms statute had been satisfied. Defendant Locke entered a guilty plea to a burglary charge
and sentence was withheld for a three-year probationary period.
The district court rejected defendant's contention that because
judgment was withheld there had been no conviction. The district court explained, "A withheld judgment is a judgment subject to a condition. Unless defendant complies with the conditions, the judgment will not be erased. In short, defendant's
prior conviction stands."39

The court of appeals in Locke did not reach a conclusion
concerning whether the prior conviction element was to be determined by state or federal law. The court avoided the issue on
appeal, stating that the district court "correctly applied the applicable state and federal law . . . ."'0 In Locke it was not essen33. Pricepaul claimed his guilty plea was not made in accordance with the California
reading of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), as announced in In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d
122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969). For a discussion of Boykin, see notes 4649
infra and accompanying text.
34. According to the Pricepaul court,
The construction of a federal statute is a matter solely of federal law, and the degree to which a federal statute incorporates or refers to 8tate law is a question of federal statutorY
interpretation • • • • Since the California interpretation of
Boykin is not • • • required by the federal constitution, the
district court should apply the federal view of Boykin.
540 F.2d at 424-25.
35. 328 U.S. at 208. See note 16 supra.
36. 528 F.2d at 887. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
37. 540 F.2d at 424.
38. 409 F. Supp. 600 (D. Idaho 1976), afl'd, 542 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1976).
39. 409 F. Supp. at 604.
40. 542 F.2f1 at 801. The district court stated the definition of "conviction" it
adopted: "fA] 'conviction' is the stage of a criminal proceeding where the issue of guilt is
determined and a 'sentence' is the second stage in a criminal procedure whereupon the
Court decrees by judgment the sentence the defendant is to receive." 409 F. Supp. at
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tial to come to a resolution of the issue because the court found
Locke had been convicted under state law.41
Just weeks after the Ninth Circuit decision in Benson, the
Tenth Circuit ruled on a closely parallel case. In United States
v. Stober,"2 the defendant was charged with a violation of section 922(h)(1). He was found guilty and appealed, claiming the
prior conviction element was not satisfied by his guilty plea
under an Oklahoma deferred judgment procedure. The ~ourt
held that Stober had not been convicted under Oklahoma law
and that the federal statute's requirement that a felon be
"convicted in any court" must be met by a conviction in "the
court which tried th~~ accused. That court was really the only
court which could convict; if he was not guilty there, he was not
guilty for the purpose of making his act here concerned a
crime . . . ."43 The Tenth Circuit's reasoning, in contrast to
'that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, requires "conviction in the
Oklahoma Court by the Oklahoma Court. There is not issue of
comity and no issue of preemption.""" The Stober analysis establishes that at least in the Tenth Circuit, "[t]he defendant is
entitled to, and must, rely on the jurisdiction in which he was
charged.. The federal courts must rely on the state to determine
whether there was a conviction. . .. [T]he states can decide
how to punish violations of their laws, not the federal courts."n
Having established in the Ninth Circuit that federal law
governs the determination of a' prior conviction under section
922(h)(1), what is the effect of a guilty plea under federal law?
603: The district court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of "conviction" in this
determination. See notes 46-49 infra and accompanying text.
41. Locke was told by a public defender that under the deferred prosecution statute
his conviction would not be entered on his criminal record. Although Locke thought that
he was not a convicted felon under Idaho law, and had no knowledge that he would be
subject to federal disabilities because of his prior state violation, his conviction was upheld on appeal. The fact that he was erroneously counselled had no significance in the
court's analysis, because intent was not considered a factor. 592 F.2d at 801. See note 24
supra.
42. 604 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. [d. at 1276, 1277. The court also referred to the general full faith and credit
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), which requires courts to give full faith and credit to
state legislative acts and judicial records and proceedings.
44. 604 F.2d at 1277.
45. [d. at 1278.
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In Boykin v. Alabama,46 the Supreme Court declared, "A plea of
guilty is more than a confession that the accused did various
acts; it is itself a conviction."41 By entering a guilty plea, an accused waives important constitutional rights: the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the
right to confront one's accusers.48 The Supreme Court held that
a state trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea, without an affirmative showing that the plea was voluntary and intelligent, is
obtained in violation of due process.49
C.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The brief majority opinion noted that whether Benson had
been "convicted" under TIIinois law was unclear,lSo but flatly
stated that "[w]hether he was convicted for purposes of
§ 922(h)(1), however, is ultimately a question of federal law."1S1
The panel cited, without discussion, several cases in support of
this unequivocal determination. United States v. BergemanlSS
and United States v. Princepaul lSs are two cases in which the
Ninth Circuit held that federal law controls in the determination
of a prior conviction under the federal firearms law. The majority in Benson also referred to Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Beaver County, M a Supreme Court case concerning the extent
state law should be applied when incorporated by reference in a
federal law. The opinion also listed several other Ninth Circuit
cases which lend support to the conclusion, but which are not
dispositive on the issue.ISIS
Turning to the question of whether under applicable federal
law Benson had been previously "convicted," the majority considered the legal effect of Benson's guilty plea. They relied on
46. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
47. ld. at 242 (citing Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1926).
48. ld. at 243 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
49. 395 U.S. at 243 n.5.
50. 605 F.2d at 1094.
51. ld.
52. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
54. 328 U.S. 204 (1946). See note 16 supra.
55. 605 F.2d at 1094 (citing United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978);
Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Locke, 542 F.2d
800, 801 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the Supreme Court's declaration in Boykin v. Alabama that a
guilty plea "is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give
judgment and determine punishment. "liS The Benson Court
pointed out that the Illinois court explained the consequences of
pleading guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance before accepting Benson's guilty plea. The majority concluded that the Illinois court's acceptance of the plea and subsequent sentencing constituted a "conviction" under section
922(h)(1).1i7 Furthermore, when faced with a "similar" issue in
United States v. Locke, the court held that under "controlling
federal law" the defendant had been "convicted." In Locke the
defendant was given a three-year probationary period persuant
to a deferred judgment statute. Benson's sentence to probation
was under a deferred prosecution statute. The opinion did not
consider this distinction. Briefly mentioned in a footnote was the
fact that Locke was convicted under applicable state law.lis
Ignoring these differences, the majority found that Locke controlled Benson's claim.1i9
Judge Ely "reluctantly" concurred, solely because he believed the precedent in the Ninth Circuit was compelling. He
nevertheless expressed his opposition to the court's conclusion
on the ground that a state should have the "right to define and
determine when an individual has been convicted under the
state's law."so Accordingly, he believed the majority's holding
had "unnecessarily and unjustifiably intruded upon a sovereign
right that ... appropriately belongs to the states."al Judge Ely's
contention was that because section 922 (h) (1) does not define
the term "conviction," the determination should be left to the
states.S2 Resolving the ambiguity in the federal statute in this
manner would, according to Judge Ely, protect the states from
federal intrusion.
Judge Ely cited United States v. Bass, in which the Su56. 395 u.s. at 242.
57. See 605 F.2d at 1095, suggesting that the plea was properly made in accordance
with Boykin. However, in 1974, when Benson entered his plea, Hoctor was still the law in
the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d at 886 (Wright J., concurring).
58. 605 F.2d at 1095 & n.3.
59. Id. at 1095.
60.Id.
6!. Id.
62. Id. at 1096.
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preme Court held that "unless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance."63 In addition, section 922(h)(1) is governed by section 927,64 which indicates that Congress intended
not to intrude into "areas traditionally reserved to the states."
Judge Ely distinguished cases arising under deferred prosecution statutes, such as Benson, where no judgment of conviction is entered, from those arising under expunction statutes.
However, he maintained that in either circumstance he would
hold there was no conviction. 611 In Judge Ely's opinion, "[t]he
states enact these laws to deter recidivism and to promote the
full rehabilitation of their citizens. In each case, the state has
chosen to allow an individual familiar with the specific circumstances-the trial judge-to determine what criminal and civil
sanction should attach."66 He argued that federal intrusion in
this area impinges on the states' power to institute effective rehabilitation programs and significantly changes the federal-state
.
balance. 67
The majority did not refer to the concern for national uniformity in the application of the federal statute, but this is an
issue given a great deal of weight in the cases upon which the
majority relied. Judge Ely argued that the unstated goal of uniform application of the law would be unaided by the court's decision. He pointed out that a felon, as defined by section
922(h)(1), must have been convicted of a crime punishable by a
term exceeding one year, and that penalties for crimes vary considerably from state to state. Consequently, a person convicted
of a crime in one state may be a felon within the meaning of the
statute, although a person convicted of the same crime in another state would not fall within its ambit. This situation makes
the uniform application of the federal statute impossible, even if
federal law determines whether or not there has been a
conviction.68
63. 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).

64. See note 18 supra.
65. 605 F.2d at 1096.
66.ld.
67.ld.
68.ld.
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SIGNIFICANCE

Benson establishes that in the Ninth Circuit a guilty plea constitutes a conviction for purposes of section 922(h)(1). The court
did not acknowledge that its holding significantly expands the
application of the mE~asure. No precedent was cited for finding
the existence of a predicate "conviction" under federal law
where the defendant was never "convicted" under applicable
state law. Finding Benson's claim of error to be controlled by
their earlier decision in Locke, the court avoided addressing constitutional que~tions and policy concerns.
The majority opinion did not differentiate between the effect of deferred prosecutions, where no judgment of conviction is
ever entered, and post-conviction measures, such as pardons and
expunction statutes which attempt to "erase" convictions. The
underlying policy which motivates states to enact these measures is the same, an.d in many cases only the label differs. 69 A
system which allows persons to believe that criminal sanctions
will be removed upon successful completion of their probationary term, only to be told later that the federal law does not recognize the relief provided by the states, undercuts the credibility
of government.
Whether Benson could reasonably be expected to realize
that he was a convicted felon within the scope of the federal
statute is an issue which merited examination by the court. Had
Benson been tried in the Tenth Circuit rather than the Ninth,
following the Stober court's reasoning his conviction would have
been reversed. Conflict among the circuits makes the statutory
ambiguity fundamen.tally unfair. The status of the defendant as
a convicted felon is one that should not be subject to conjecture,
nor should it change as he moves from one jurisdiction to another. One subject to disabilities under the federal law is entitled to notice of that disability.'1O
69. Note, A State Pardon Does Not Inherently Remove Federal Disabilities, and
Congress Did Not Intend State Pardons to Remove Licensing Disabilities Under the
Gun Control Act of 1968, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1332, 1339 (1975) [hereinafter cited as State
Pardon].
70. A criminal statute is constitutionally infirm if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his comtemplated conduct is forbidden by Statute."
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114 (1979).
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In the recent case of Lewis v. United States,'1l the Supreme
Court recognized this conflict among the circuits in their interpretation of the federal firearms law. In Lewis the Court held
that an underlying conviction subject to constitutional attack
would satisfy the prior conviction element of the federal firearms
offense. The majority relied on the sweeping intent of the legislature in enacting the measure.'12 The Lewis Court did not address the question of the effect of a guilty plea under the federal
statute.
It has been argued that Congress linked federal disabilities

to "conviction," and not guilt.'13 However, the adoption of the
Supreme Court's definition of "conviction" in Boykin makes this
distinction moot. The argument raises the question, however,
whether this is the definition Congress intended for the courts to
apply. In Boykin, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea
constituted a conviction in order to guarantee a criminal defendant would not be deprived of fundamental rights. Does the application of the Boykin definition in Benson controvert the intent of the Supreme Court or of Congress? Because of the
conflict in the circuits as to the construction of the statute, the
issue should be resolved by the Supreme Court.

Bonita L. Marmor*

71. 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980).
72. The majority stated, "we view the language Congress chose as consistent with
the common-sense notion that a disability based upon one's status as a convicted felon
should cease only when the conviction upon which the status depends has been vacated."
ld. at 918 n.5.
The dissent argued that the statutory language was ambiguous, since it clearly does
not reach "any person who has been convicted" because those whose convictions have
been reversed on appeal or vacated must not be included. The dissent concluded that
"the principle of lenity requires us to resolve any doubts against the harsher alternative
and to read the statute to prohibit the possession of firearms only by those who have
been constitutionally convicted of a felony. ld. at 923.
73. State Pardons, supra note 69 at 1340-41.
• Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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VI. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW &
PROCEDURE
In United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.
1979), a reliable informant advised DEA agents that a particular
car was being used to smuggle narcotics into the United States.
The car was stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint and defendant, the driver of thl~ car, was taken to an office to wait for the
arrival of the DEA agents. Two and one-half hours later the
agents arrived, and after another thirty minutes, defendant was
informed of his Miranda rights, and the defendant gave permission to the agents to search the car. Cocaine was discovered in a
headlamp. Defendant was again given a Miranda warning, and
he admitted he was paid to drive the car and that he knew the
cocaine was hidden in. the car. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the evidence of the cocaine should have been excluded.
Holding that the tip by the reliable informant provided a
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, 609 F.2d at 1286 (citing
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1977», and that defendant's statement and consent to the search were voluntary,
id. (citing United States v. Dubrovsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212 (9th
Cir. 1978», the court ruled that the evidence of the cocaine was
inadmissable because of the delay between the initial stop and
the consent to the search. Relying on Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200 (1979), the court ruled that because the detention
was so similar to an arrest, probable cause to arrest the defendant was required. I][l Dunaway, the Supreme Court ruled that
where a person is detained for the purpose of custodial interrogation, fourth amendlment safeguards are required.
Having found th.at probable cause was required for the detention, the Ninth Circuit applied the test of Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 114 (1964), and held that the information provided by the
informant was not sufficiently detailed to support probable
cause. The court also ruled that the government had failed to
. meet its burden of proving that the "taint" was sufficiently attenuated to allow the evidence to be admitted.

In United States v. Ocheltree, 622 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980),
a DEA agent asked defendant, a traveller waiting at an airport,
if he could search the defendant's briefcase for narcotics. The
DEA agent told defendant that he need not consent to the
search, but if he did not, that a search warrant would be ob-
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tained. Defendant consented, and narcotics paraphernalia were
discovered. The agent detained defendant, obtained a search
warrant, and found narcotics in defendant's suitcase, which defendant had checked as baggage.
The court of appeals held that the consent to the search was
involuntary because in telling defendant that a warrant would
be sought if defendant refused to consent to the search, the
DEA agent implied that defendant would be kept in custody until the warrant was obtained. Because the DEA agent did not
have probable cause until the briefcase was searched, retaining
defendant in custody would have been an unlawful arrest under
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), and consent under
such circumstances was involuntarily given.
In United States v. Allen, No. 79-1721 (9th Cir. 1980), DEA
officials received a tip from an airline ticket salesperson that defendant, who fit the DEA's "airport drug courier profile," had
just purchased a roundtrip ticket from Seattle to San Francisco.
The profile lists several characteristics believed to be commonly
exhibited by those carrying narcotics by airplane. DEA agents
stopped defendant when he returned to Seattle, and informed
him that they believed he was carrying drugs. Defendant later
consented to a body search. When no drugs were found on his
person, the agents asked defendant if they could search the
briefcase he was carrying. Defendant refused, and the agents
seized the briefcase. Following the seizure, defendant made selfincriminating statements, and in an application for a search warrant, the DEA agents cited these statements as supporting probable cause. The search warrant was obtained several days after
the stop, and LSD was found in the briefcase.
The court of appeals held that the search was unjustified
because it was unsupported by probable cause. The court found
that the facts that defendant matched the profile and he appeared nervous when approached by the agents would not lead a
:reasonable person to believe defendant had committed a crime.
The court noted that an innocent traveller might become nervous when accused of carrying drugs. Similarly, the fact that the
search of defendant's person revealed no contraband did not
support an inference that defendant carried drugs in his briefcase. Therefore, the seizure of defendant's briefcase was unjustified, and the fruits of that seizure must be excluded.
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In Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980)
appellant had earlier been found guilty of a crime and was sentenced to a term of five years. The sentence was suspended on
the condition that appellant forfeit all his assets to the government and the he work for charity without pay. Appellant argued
that these conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Relying on United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d
259 (9th Cir. 1975), the court stated that the validity of probation conditions depends on 1) the purpose of the conditions; and
2) whether the conditions are reasonably related to the purpose.
Noting that rehabilitation of the criminal and protection of society are the primary purposes of probation conditions, the court
stated that neither punishment of the convicted nor circumvention of statutory sentencing limits is a proper primary' purpose
of probation. The court held that the cumulative effect of the
probation conditions in this case constituted a much harsher restriction than necessary to rehabilitate the appellant, and the
conditions were therE~fore impermissible.

In United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980),
the Ninth Circuit held that special treatment of bail conditions
for those charged with capital offenses derive from the nature of
the offense charged and not from the fact that the potential penalty is death.
The district court found defendant, a Federal Protective Of~
ficer, guilty of the ral~e and murder of a young female alien. The
district court also found that defendant regularly wore firearms
while at home and that he once left a note saying that he was
going across the border. The trial court concluded that defendant was a flight risk who posed a threat to other people, and
applied 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976), which controls the granting of
bail in cases where the defendant "is charged with an offense
punishable by death," and denied bail.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court failed
to follow Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in which the
Court proscribed the imposition of the death penalty under such
statutes. Had the trial court properly followed Furman, defendant argued, § 3146p which governs release on charges not punishable by death, would have applied.
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's argument, and re- .
fused to apply Furman to render unconstitutional all statutes
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that were tied to capital offenses. Instead, the court looked to
the purpose of the rule to determine if it derived from the potential severity of the punishment. In this case, the court found
that the purpose of § 3148 was to impose different bail conditions for those capital crimes where the offense - and not the
penalty - differed. Consequently, the court held that § 3148
survived Furman and was valid.
In United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1980),
the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's chaIIenge that the trial
court erroneously submitted an Allen charge to the jury. The
defendant was charged with five counts of mail fraud. After the
trial, the jury deliberated for over eight hours without reaching a
verdict. The judge then instructed the jury that those jurors in
the minority should reappraise their doubts to determine if
those doubts were reasonable. The jury deliberated three and
one-half hours more before returning a guilty verdict.
On appeal, defendant argued that the judge's instruction
constituted an Allen charge. Courts disfavor an Allen charge because it has a potentiaIIy coercive effect on the minority jury
members to alter their views based on the perceived opinion of
the court or the opinion of the majority, and not on the evidence
and law.
The Ninth Circuit held that an Allen charge exists only if
the charge was both premature and had a coercive effect on the
jury. The court of appeals found no evidence of a coercive effect
in this case. Furthermore, the court distinguished United States
v. Contretas, 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972), where coercive effect
was found. In Contretas, following the aIIeged Allen charge, the
jury deliberated and decided on a verdict in thirty-five minutes.
In the present case, the jury deliberated an additional three and
one-half hours, a sufficient time to reach a "reasoned decision."
In United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980), the
court of appeals held that defendant's attorney had no right to
be present at a hearing in which customs agents sought a court
order requiring defendant to submit to a strip search; that the
magistrate had legal authority to issue an order compelling defendant to submit to a strip search and x-ray; that, even though
defendant's attorney was not present during a body cavity
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search, the search did not exceed the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard; that defendant's seven hour detention was
legal; and that the evidence supported the giving of the Jewell
instruction. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1976).
Customs officials searched defendant's baggage upon her arrival at the San Francisco International Airport from Bangkok,
Thailand. The agents found items which, when coupled with defendant's awkwardness in walking and sitting, led them to suspect that the defendant was carrying something in a body cavity.
The officials asked defendant to submit to a strip search, and
she refused. The officials then obtained a court order requiring
defendant to submit to a strip search and x-ray. The x-ray revealed a foreign body in defendant's vagina, which defendant
voluntarily removed. The foreign body was a plastic container
which held packets oj[ heroin. This series of events lasted about
seven hours, part of which time defendant's attorney was present. The trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence of
the heroin.
Defendant appealed on five grounds. First, defendant argued that because hel~ attorney sought and was refused access to
contest the search order, the' government violated her due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. The court
equated the government's request for a court order to a request
for a search warrant, traditionally, an ex parte proceeding. The
court then held that defendant's due process rights were not
violated.
Second, defendant contested the magistrate's legal authority
to issue the order for a strip search and x-ray. The court found
that the order was based on probable cause and held that the
magistrate had the power to issue the order pursuant to Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41.
Third, the defendant argued that the body cavity search exceeded the fourth amendment reasonableness standard because
her attorney was excluded. The Ninth Circuit examined the precautionary steps the customs agents took to minimize the intrusiveness of the sear·ch. The court found that the presence of
counsel may have been of some emotional support, but in this
stituation, depriving defendant of this support was insufficient
to make the search unreasonable.
Fourth, defendant challenged the legality of the detention.
The court stated that the legality of the detention must be de-
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termined according to what was necessary for the officials to
conduct a legal border search. The court held that, under the
circumstances, seven hours was not an improper length of
detention.
Finally, the defendant argued that an instruction regarding
defendant's deliberate ignorance of certain facts should not have
been given. The court compared the facts in Jewel with those in
the present case and found sufficient basis to conclude that defendant was deliberately ignorant of the contents of the plastic
container. The court concluded that the instruction was proper.
In United States v. Bronstein, 623 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1980), the Ninth Circuit held that where a plea bargain provided
that the government waive its right of allocution and would remain silent at the time of sentencing except to correct factual
misrepresentations, the government's comments concerning defendant's alleged and unrelated conduct constituted a breach of
the plea bargain and required a remand for resentencing.
Defendant was charged with subscribing false individual
and corporate tax returns and with conspiracy related to these
tax offenses. On the sixth day of trial, defendant and the government entered into a written plea bargain in which the government waived its right of allocution and agreed to remain silent
at the time of sentencing except to correct any factual misrepresentations. The court accepted the plea bargain and set a sentencing date. On that date, the trial judge asked for additional
information regarding the Internal Revenue Service's policy on
voluntary disclosure. Both sides presented witnesses to testify
on this matter. The prosecution stated that they would stay
within the limits of the plea bargain. At the conclusion of the
trial, however, the government raised several of its arguments,
including that the defendant had committed other wrongful
acts. After sentencing, defendant moved to correct the sentence,
arguing that it was imposed illegally. The motion was denied.
On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the sentence and
remanded the case for resentencing. The court first looked at its
recent decision in United States v. Arnett, No. 79-1243 (9th
Cir., Nov. 26, 1979), in which the court determined that ambiguities of plea bargains must be resolved by looking at the facts to
establish the intent of the parties. The court found Arnett inapplicable in this case, however, because the government argued
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that it was staying within the limits of the agreement, and because the agreement was clear as to the intent of the parties.
The court went on the examine the parties' conduct at the hearing and found that the government's comments regarding defendant's alleged and unlrelated criminal activities constituted a
breach of the agreemeDlt. The court thus remanded the decision
to the district court fOlr resentencing.

In.'United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1980),
the court held, inter alia, that the government need only make
reasonable efforts to produce an informant, and that the failure
to produce the informant did not violate the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront his accusers. Goldman, an inmate
at the Los Angeles COUlllty Jail, agreed with a Los Angeles police
officer that he would implicate defendant in exchange for a recommendation that he be released on his own recognizance.
About a month later, defendant asked Goldman to learn if a certain United States district judge would grant probation to Phil
Izsak, who was awaiting sentencing, in exchange for $75,000.
Goldman then informed the police officer and two investigators of the proposed bribe. Eagan, one of the investigators,
agreed to pose as the judge's girlfriend. Goldman then called defendant and told him that the bribe could be arranged through
the judge's "girlfriend." They agreed to meet.
At the meeting, hoth Goldman and Eagen were equipped
with transmitters. After Eagan's early departure from the meeting, at which the possible bribe was discussed, defendant expressed concern that she might be an undercover agent.
Goldman assured him that she was not. In the district court, defendant was convicted. of conspiracy and of corrupt endeavoring
to influence an officer of the court.
.
On appeal, defendant challenged the absence of Goldman
from the trial as a deprivation of his sixth amendment right to
confront accusers. The Ninth Circuit relied on United States v.
Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120
(1977), in which the ICOurt held that the government need only
use reasonable efforts to produce an informant. In this case, the
government attempted to locate Goldman by interviewing his
acquaintances and relatives, by issuing a warrant for his arrest
for unlawful flight, and by inquiring at the County Coroner's Office. The court concluded that the government had expended
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reasonable efforts to locate Goldman, and the defendant's claims
were therefore without merit.
In United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979), a
person paced the length of the Seattle airport, tightly holding a
briefcase. Subsequently, he met with defendant and both purchased one-way tickets to Los Angeles with cash. Narcotics
agents who had observed the two became suspicious and called
in to a narcotics computer. They learned that defendant\i)was a
known drug trafficker. The agents contacted Los Angeles narcotics agents and advised them to watch for the two.
The Los Angeles agents followed the two men to a building
near a beach, and the next morning, when the two men returned
to Seattle, four agents were waiting for them at the airport. One
agent followed them into a rest room and observed defendant go
into a stall, lift one leg, and then the other. The agents stopped
the men as they walked through the airport. According to the
agents, both men agreed to accompany the agents to an interviewing room.
One agent took defendant into an interview room, gave him
a Miranda warning, and conducted a weapons search. On defendant's leg the agent felt bulges, which the agent subsequently
determined to be bags of cocaine. The trial court found the stop
and seizure reasonable and well founded. The Ninth Circuit
agreed.
The court of appeals first decided that the initial investigative stop was justified. An investigative stop must be based on a
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to
commit a criminal act. Here, the court found that because the
agents were trained to spot drug dealers, and defendant's actions
(a nervous manner, purchase of tickets with cash to a major drug
center, virtually immediate return flight, and travelling without
luggage) fit the profile of a drug trafficker, the initial stop was
reasonable.
The court then addressed defendant's challenge that the initial stop became a constructive arrest when the agents brought
him to an interview room. The court held that a justified stop
does not become unjustified when the investigating officer moves
the stop to a more congenial place.
Finally, defendant argued that the pat-down search was improper because the agents had no reasonable belief that defen-
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dant was armed. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that the very nature of the crime defendant was suspected of gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant may
be armed. Rejecting defendant's arguments that because the
agents did not search him at the initial stop they had no reasonable suspicion that he was armed and that the search in the
room was not based on any reasonable suspicion, the court held
that a single agent in a closed room need not be certain that
defendant is armed before a limited pat-down search is justified.
In United States D. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1979), a
narcotics agent saw an unidentified suitcase which had apparently fallen from a conveyor belt in an airport. The detective
informed an airline employee, who could not find anyone who
could identify the suitcase. The detective then accompanied the
employee to a private area where the employee attempted to
open the suitcase to determine its owner. The detective then
tapped or kicked the suitcase, and its lock opened. A revolver
and twenty-three powlds of cocaine were inside the suitcase. In
Los Angeles, defendant reported a lost suitcase which matched
the description of the suitcase found by the detective. The suitcase was delivered to defendant, and she was subsequently
arrested.
The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence supported the
lower court's finding that the search was a private one initiated
by the airline employee. The defendant claimed that the presence and assistance of the detective rendered the search a governmental one, and that constitutional safeguards were required.
The court disagreed, and found the detective's "slight" participation insufficient to convert the private search into a governmental one.
Judge Hug dissented and argued that the detective's extreme interest in the suitcase was motivated by a desire to
search the suitcase fOll" contraband under the guise of an authorized private search.

In United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980),
defendant waited in B. car while the co-defendant robbed a bank.
Police apprehended both men shortly thereafter. Immediately
following the arrest, the police searched the car and discovered a
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paper bag containing all the stolen money and a hand gun. The
police then impounded the car for further inspection.
On appeal, defendant argued that the police were not justified in searching the car without a warrant at the place of apprehension. The Ninth Circuit relied on Chambers v. Mississippi,
399 U.S. 42 (1970) in which the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search because there was probable cause and there was
a danger that the car would be moved. The court decided that
Chambers was indistinguishable from the present case. The
court found that the police did not intend to impound the car
until a time after they discovered the bag. Consequently, at the
time of the search the automobile was not, as the defendant had
claimed, within the police's "complete and exclusive possession."
Defendant also argued that the warrantless search of the
bag found in the automobile violated his fourth amendment
rights. The defendant cited Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753
(1979), where the Court upheld a constitutional attack on a warrantless search of a suitcase. The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's claim, finding a substantial difference between the privacy interest in a suitcase and that in a paper bag.
Dissenting, Judge Tang saw the majority's analysis of the
warrantless bag search as "inverted." He argued that the burden
of proof should have been on the government to justify the warrantless search. Instead, the majority had placed the burden on
defendant to prove a warrant should have been required. The
dissent added than an attempt to justify the search of the bag
under the automobile exception would be erroneous. In any
event, the dissent argued that the government had failed in
meeting its burden.
In United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979),
one Ferrer was indicted for conspiracy to smuggle cocaine. Defendant testified at the grand jury hearing. The prosecutor, however, focused on defendant's conversation with a narcotics agent,
and not on his own acquaintance with several of the defendants
.
in the hearing.
Two years later, a second grand jury reviewed defendant's
testimony in the first grand jury hearing. Several witnesses also
testified. One witness' testimony consisted almost exclusively of
responses to the prosecutor's leading questions. The prosecutor
even responded to several of his own questions. The second
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grand jury indicted the defendant and defendant moved to dismiss the indictment.
Nine days prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss the
indictment, the prosecutor attempted to "sanitize" defendant's
indictment by leaving one thousand pages of transcript with a
third grand jury. He told this grand jury, off the record, to return a decision in eight days. One live witness testified and in
seven days the third grand jury indicted the defendant.
The district court orally gran~d defendant's motion to dismiss in March 1978. The court, however, did not give a written
decision until two months later. The government filed its notice
of appeal in June.
The Ninth Circuit was first faced with the question whether
the government filed its notice of appeal "within thirty days after the entry of judgment" as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b). The court looked at the lower court's intent that its order not be final until it issued a written order.
The court recognized the potential for an oral order to be final if
intended as such. In thls case, however, the district court's intent was clear. Consequently, the government's notice of appeal
was held timely filed.
.
In addressing the more complicated issue of grand jury bias,
the Ninth Circuit first distinguished its earlier decision in
United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977). The Chanen court reversed a dismissal of
an indictment where, like Samango, there were three grand jury
hearings and two indictments. In Chanen, however, the transcripts from earlier hellrings were read aloud, the prosecutor advised the jurors of inconsistent testimony, and the transcripts
contained witness confessions of giving false affidavits.
In the instant case, none of the above safeguards was given.
Consequently, the court did not know if the lengthy transcript
had been examined at all. Furthermore, the jurors of the later
jury coUld not weigh the credibility of the various witnesses with
nothing more than the one thousand page transcript. The Ninth
Circuit also consideredl other factors, such as the improtance of a
fair grand jury hearing, the lack of time for "thorough, thoughtful, and independent evaluation of the evidence" by the jurors,
and the prejudicial impact of the one live witness. Taking into
consideration all of these factors, the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court properly invoked its supervisory power to dismiss
the indictment.
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